Emory Law Journal
Volume 71

Issue 2

2021

The Religious Conversion of Corporate Social Responsibility
Elizabeth Sepper
James D. Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Sepper & James D. Nelson, The Religious Conversion of Corporate Social Responsibility, 71
Emory L. J. 217 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol71/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

SEPPERNELSON_12.15.21

12/16/2021 10:35 AM

THE RELIGIOUS CONVERSION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Elizabeth Sepper
James D. Nelson**
ABSTRACT
This Article debunks the analogy often drawn between principles of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and claims for corporate religious
exemption. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., which held that for-profit businesses are eligible for
religious exemptions from general laws, a rising tide of scholars and advocates
has argued that the two programs are symmetrical and mutually supportive.
Looking to the intellectual history of CSR, we demonstrate sharp conflicts—
rather than congruence—between the analytical underpinnings of CSR and
religious exemptions for corporations. Whereas CSR enlists law-abiding
corporations to advance public objectives, these religious exemptions oppose
state laws in the personal interest of shareholders. Our analysis uncovers a
fundamental mismatch between the political and economic orders imagined by
CSR and corporate religious exemptions. Corporate social responsibility posits
a distinctly democratic political economy with the state leading its corporate
allies in pursuit of societal goals. Proponents of corporate religious exemptions
subvert this tradition: corporations defend private liberty from the threat of the
public. This vision of the state and the corporation in law, politics, and the
economy proves anathema to the project of corporate social responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a corporation, let’s call it FineCorp.1 Specializing in media and live
events, FineCorp has over 800 employees. Business has been good—annual
revenue tops $50 million. And once construction is completed, FineCorp will
run its operations out of a sparkling $90 million headquarters.

1
This fictionalized hypothetical is modeled on the Complaint in O’Connor v. Lampo Group, LLC and
related news coverage. See Complaint at 3–4, O’Connor v. Lampo Grp. LLC, No. 3:2–cv-00628 (M.D. Tenn.
July 20, 2020), ECF No. 1; Bob Smietana, Is Dave Ramsey’s Empire the ‘Best Place to Work in America’? Say
No and You’re Out, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://religionnews.com/2021/01/15/dave-ramseyis-tired-of-being-called-a-jerk-for-his-stands-on-sex-and-covid/. To our knowledge, the Lampo Group has not
yet asserted a free exercise defense, as our fictional company does, but it has indicated plans to do so if plaintiff’s
religious discrimination claim goes forward. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint at 8 n.8, O’Connor v. Lampo Grp. LLC, No. 3:2–cv-00628 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2021),
ECF No. 20. Our inspiration for the hypothetical company name is found in CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER &
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 124–35 (2007) (describing the city of
“Fineville”).
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FineCorp is not all about the money, though. It sees itself as a “godly
company.” Among its values, the firm is committed to working “as unto the
Lord.” This religious message has led to the recruitment of committed
employees. Working at FineCorp, one employee reports, means she does “more
than just make a product people don’t need.” Another recalls thinking, “Wow,
here’s a for-profit that’s about Jesus.” To reward its workers, FineCorp pays well
above minimum wage. Employment is said to be a “ministry and a mission,”
which is why its founder calls FineCorp “the best place to work in America.”
But not everyone shares this enthusiasm. One employee, let’s call her Betty,
was fired last year after she became pregnant. Betty was not married—she
engaged in premarital sex in conflict with FineCorp’s values. Betty sued
FineCorp, claiming that it broke federal and state laws prohibiting sex
discrimination. The company then asked the court for a religious exemption.
Complying with the law, it says, would infringe on its free exercise of religion
in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
We might disagree on whether a religious exemption should be granted. But
is firing Betty the same as FineCorp’s decision to pay above the minimum wage?
Are both actions examples of corporate social responsibility?
A rising chorus of voices in the legal academy would say yes. Corporate
social responsibility (CSR) means that businesses may advance secular values
beyond profit maximization. So too should corporate religious exemptions
permit businesses to pursue religious values over mere profits.2 In corporate law,
one faction of scholars has embraced Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a
Supreme Court decision exempting for-profit businesses from federal law, as an
2
See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Are the Welfare State and Religious Freedom Incompatible?, 8 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 182 n.51 (2014) (observing, in support of exemption, “the connection between
recognizing businesses’ religious-freedom rights and affirming the premises of corporate social responsibility”);
Holly Fernandez Lynch & Gregory Curfman, Bosses in the Bedroom: Religious Employers and the Future of
Employer-Sponsored Health Care, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 154, 160–61 (Holly
Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds., 2017) (discussing Hobby Lobby’s corporate
religious decision as akin to and supported by corporate social responsibility); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman,
Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons,
127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 291–92 (2014) (invoking CSR policies as support for for-profit corporations’ pursuit
of religious exemptions); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?,
21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 83–84 (2013) (“Many for-profit businesses voluntarily operate in a socially
conscious manner. . . . [These] examples are important to the religious liberty question because they suggest
Americans regularly encounter, and accept, the notion of profit-making businesses taking actions based on
ethical, philosophical, and moral commitments.”); Mary Ann Glendon, Free Businesses to Act with Conscience,
BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 8, 2013, 2:01 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/12/08/should-businesshave-conscience/cK6o6G6dwrWeRJjk1uPVYM/story.html (arguing CSR and corporate claims for religious
exemption are normatively indistinguishable aspects of exercising conscience).
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endorsement of corporate social responsibility.3 By granting a corporate
religious exemption, the Court—these scholars say—affirmatively rejected
wealth maximization in favor of CSR.4 For their part, religious objectors and
their supporters have picked up the analogy and run with it. A host of advocates,
academics, and regulators have claimed that CSR advances the case for an
expansive range of corporate religious exemptions.5
Putting these claims of congruence to the test, this Article reveals that
corporate social responsibility and corporate religious exemptions prove
irreconcilable. As an initial matter, corporate social responsibility involves
doing more than state or federal laws require, whereas corporate religious
exemptions lower the regulatory bar. This obvious contradiction, we argue,
points to a deeper and more foundational divergence between the political
economies of CSR and corporate religious exemptions. Corporate social
responsibility looks to the democratic state to lead economic efforts, identify
social values, and harness corporate power in the direction of democracy. The
pursuit of corporate religious exemptions defies these core commitments. Its
underlying political economy portrays the democratic state as a looming threat,
3
573 U.S. 682, 712 (2014) (observing that corporations routinely support charitable causes, including
environmental protection and humanitarian aid, and noting “[i]f for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy
objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well”).
4
E.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 22–23
(2014) (arguing that in “a landmark in corporate law” the Supreme Court had determined corporations properly
pursue aims other than wealth maximization).
5
See, e.g., ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, Introduction to AN EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO FAITH IN THE
WORKPLACE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHRISTIANS WHO OWN A BUSINESS (2016), https://
centerforfaithandwork.com/sites/default/files/PDFs/FaithInTheWorkplace_LeTourneau_FINAL.pdf (“[W]hile
some business owners are cheered and commended when they blend certain beliefs and work, Christian business
owners are often derided and denigrated, and sometimes face legal challenges, when they do the same.”). For
examples of academics making a similar case, see Ronald J. Colombo, Religious Conceptions of Corporate
Purpose, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813, 840 (2017) (arguing “corporate religious liberty fosters a more robust
approach to corporate social responsibility” and should free for-profit corporations from having to act contrary
to religious doctrine); Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 780
(2015) (“Corporations may be used to pursue moral goals that aim to make the world a better place—an idea
that resonates with the (generally left-of-center) corporate social responsibility movement. Where such goals are
rooted in religious principles, a corporation may, and should, be able to invoke RFRA protections.”).
With regard to regulators, a leaked draft of the Trump Administration’s proposed rule exempting
employers with religious or moral exemptions from the contraceptive mandate reads:

[B]usinesses large and small take positions on matters of social justice, community benefit, and
ethical concerns beyond profit. . . . Therefore, the Departments consider it appropriate to exempt
any entity possessing religious beliefs or moral convictions against the coverage required by the
Mandate, regardless of its corporate structure or ownership interests.
Dylan Scott & Sarah Kliff, Leaked Regulation: Trump Plans to Roll Back Obamacare Birth Control Mandate,
VOX (May 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/31/15716778/trump-birthcontrol-regulation.
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corporations as bulwarks of freedom, and the public as narrow in scope. This
vision of the state and the corporation in law, politics, and the economy proves
antithetical to corporate social responsibility.
By exposing these underlying tensions, this Article clarifies the stakes of
debates over the rights and responsibilities of businesses. Our analysis leads to
the conclusion that CSR provides no support for exempting business
corporations from regulation. It further reveals that CSR may be at an inflection
point. If some CSR enthusiasts continue to define religious exemptions as
socially responsible behavior, they risk corrupting the concept beyond
recognition. If, instead, CSR proponents unite in rejecting religious exemptions,
they might yet revive CSR in the context of new initiatives for corporate
accountability.
Two brief notes about methodology. First, in making this argument, we draw
upon the long intellectual history of CSR in legal and management scholarship.6
By isolating the central strands of CSR as an intellectual project, we develop a
manageable standard against which to measure the coherence of arguments
made in its name. We adopt a standard and widely accepted definition of the
concept: corporate social responsibility requires managers to attempt to further
societal, labor, or environmental goals in ways that do not advance—or may
even impede—shareholder wealth maximization. Second, we aim to give a fair
and charitable account of both corporate social responsibility and corporate
religious exemptions. In previous work, we have opposed corporate religious
exemptions on both doctrinal and normative grounds.7 We have also criticized
corporate social responsibility, in theory and in practice.8 Here, we neither
defend nor contest either concept. We instead evaluate how they hang together.9

6
For more extensive treatments of CSR’s history, see generally ARCHIE B. CARROLL, KENNETH J.
LIPARTITO, JAMES E. POST & PATRICIA H. WERHANE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (2012); ANDREW MYSZEWSKI, MANAGING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 8–10 (Archie B.
Carroll ed., 1977); Andrew Myszewski, Responsible Riches: The Intellectual Development of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 1920–1960 (May 27, 2010) (Senior Honors Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison),
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/44214 (detailing the history of corporate social responsibility between the
years 1920 and 1960).
7
See Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501 (2012); James D. Nelson,
Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (2013).
8
For a comprehensive account, see James D. Nelson, The Trouble with Corporate Conscience, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 1655 (2018). See also Elizabeth Sepper, supra note 7, at 1547 (“Within for-profit businesses, even
though moral convictions might come into play, the profit motive (in some cases, an obligation to maximize
shareholder wealth) must drive decisionmaking.”).
9
Nevertheless, by highlighting the disanalogies between CSR and corporate religious exemptions, our
analysis may help blunt charges of hypocrisy leveled against those who support CSR and not religious
exemption. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Part I begins by introducing the questions that have split corporate law
scholarship for the last century: In whose interests should a corporation act? And
what purposes may a corporation pursue? As we explain, for the majority of
corporate law scholars, the answer is clear: corporations serve as vehicles to
maximize the financial wealth of shareholders.10 A tenacious minority of
corporate law scholars dissent, insisting that corporations can—and should—
have broader social purposes and owe duties to stakeholders outside of
shareholders.11
In 2014, certain supporters of corporate social responsibility claimed a
victory in this long-running debate. The Supreme Court, they said, had affirmed
the principles of CSR in granting a religious exemption to a for-profit business
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.12 A variety of commentators in corporate
law and church-state law explicitly linked CSR and corporate religious
exemptions.13
In Parts II–IV, we debunk these claims of congruence. Part II explores an
evident contradiction between corporate social responsibility’s commitment to
legal compliance and corporate religious objectors’ claims to opt out of
generally applicable legal minimums.14 This inconsistency has prompted some
exemption advocates to respond that objecting businesses in fact seek to enforce

10
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 552 (2002); Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 106 (2020); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001) (arguing wealth maximization was so completely
accepted as to be the end of history for corporate law); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2073 (2001) (“Norms in American business circles,
starting with business school education, emphasize the value, appropriateness, and indeed the justice of
maximizing shareholder wealth.”).
11
See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 62–63 (2012) (suggesting humans as a whole are
“prosocial” and generally act in moral ways to avoid causing harm to others); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763 (2005) (“[N]o corporate statute has ever
stated that the sole purpose of corporations is maximizing profits for shareholders.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 303 (1999) (“[C]ase law . . . often
explicitly authorizes directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests to protect other constituencies.”).
12
573 U.S. 682, 690–91 (2014).
13
See infra notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
14
It is of course possible to argue that a corporation should be permitted to pursue religiously motivated
goals consistent with this tradition. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to Promote Corporate
Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 872 (2004) (arguing corporations should exceed de minimis legal
obligations and adopt a religious approach of responsibility to employees, consumers, and the public). We take
proponents of the argument from CSR to go further.
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legal protections for religious exercise and thus do not defy any legal
obligations.15 We consider this response and explain why it proves wanting.
More fundamentally, the political economies presumed and sustained by
corporate social responsibility and corporate religious exemptions, respectively,
are at loggerheads—as Parts III and IV argue. The first disagreement revolves
around the problem of power. CSR’s intellectual history manifests remarkable
consistency: corporate power poses an existential threat to the democratic state
and to the people who depend on it. The solution that CSR proposes is to enlist
corporations to advance the state’s objectives. Proponents of corporate religious
exemptions, by contrast, take the state to be the primary threat to liberty. Their
solution is for corporations to serve as intermediary institutions, standing guard
against state incursions and protecting private moralities from state supremacy.
Another source of tension concerns the role of regulation. For theorists of
CSR, democratically enacted laws that place obligations on businesses provide
the guideposts for socially responsible action. Through regulation, the state
identifies social needs and sets the direction for ethical business. But these same
regulations play an antagonistic role in the story of corporate religious
exemptions. Religious objectors reject the social goals embodied in the law in
favor of their own religious commitments.
Finally, CSR and religious exemptions propose conceptions of the public
and private that are poles apart. Central to the theory of corporate social
responsibility is the “publicness” of nominally private business corporations.
Corporations, the theory instructs, perform social as well as economic functions.
Under such circumstances, they owe responsibilities not just toward
shareholders, but also toward the wider corporate community, including
employees, creditors, localities, and society as a whole. Market and politics
prove fluid and overlapping.
In contrast, claims for religious exemption assert a rigid line between public
and private. Through analogies to the family, the religious corporation becomes
distinctly private. Its relationships with employees and consumers, on this view,
should be set by contract without state intervention. And the corporation
promotes a dramatically narrower set of corporate interests—those of
controlling shareholders whose religious beliefs are engrafted onto the
corporation. It becomes private property, not public concern.

15

See infra note 99.
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Part III explores these themes with regard to CSR. Part IV focuses on the
political economy of corporate religious exemptions. By highlighting
discrepancies between the political economies of CSR and corporate religious
exemptions, our analysis reveals new pathways forward for fields of law and
religion, corporate law, and various literatures in law and political economy. One
modest—but critical—step is for proponents of religious exemptions to abandon
their reliance on CSR. Although its invocation may have provided a transitory
strategic advantage in litigation and public relations, the analogy was
intellectually misplaced from the outset and may have crowded out stronger
arguments for religious exemption.
On the flip side, as Part V argues, CSR supporters should repudiate Hobby
Lobby and attend to the subversive political economy of corporate religious
exemptions. CSR supporters cannot continue to embrace immunity for
corporations from antidiscrimination and social welfare protections without
converting the normative pull of heightened corporate responsibility into
increased corporate power. These corporations now object on religious grounds
to serving same-sex couples, covering preventive healthcare services, and
making employment decisions without discrimination.16 In Bostock v. Clayton
County,17 the Supreme Court seemed to invite additional corporate demands for
exemption, indicating that religious exercise might “supersede Title VII’s
commands.”18 To label these claims social responsibility corrupts the concept’s
core meaning.
CSR’s supporters might still have the opportunity to revive its central
insights. The pressing socioeconomic transformations of our time have ignited
interest in corporate accountability in the academy and politics. These debates
might draw inspiration from the earlier, and more authentic, versions of CSR
that we uncover in this Article.

16
See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018) (extending rights
to free exercise under the Constitution to a for-profit bakery objecting to serving same-sex couples); Telescope
Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 752–53 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding a videography company has free speech
and free exercise rights not to comply with antidiscrimination law); Kelley v. Azar, No. 4:20-CV-00283-O, 2021
WL 4025804, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss claims of individual and corporate
plaintiffs that requirement to cover preexposure prophylaxis (“PreEP”) drugs violates their religious freedom);
E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841–42 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (involving
claims to religious exemption from employment nondiscrimination under the Civil Rights Act).
17
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
18
Id. at 1754. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. (2012)).
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THE CONTOURS OF THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION DEBATES

Over the last century, corporate law has lived with a recurring dispute over
the responsibilities of corporations. As section A explains, scholars divide over
two related questions: In whose interests should a corporation act? And what
purposes may a corporation pursue?
On one side are those who view corporations as vehicles to maximize the
financial wealth of shareholders. This position has so firmly taken hold of
corporate law that two of the world’s most accomplished corporate law scholars
have declared “the end of history for corporate law” and the triumph of
shareholder primacy.19
On the other side, scholars advance the notion of corporate social
responsibility. Corporations can—and should—have broader social purposes
and owe duties to stakeholders outside of shareholders, they say.
In 2014, some supporters of corporate social responsibility claimed a victory
of their own. The Supreme Court, they said, had confirmed the authority of
corporations to pursue objectives beyond shareholder profit in a case involving
religious exemptions for for-profit corporations. In their view, Hobby Lobby
definitively validated CSR and repudiated the primacy of shareholder profit.20
Corporate religious exemption became linked to CSR, as section B details.
A. Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Discontents
Intellectual histories commonly trace the origins of corporate social
responsibility to the famous 1930s debate between Adolf Berle and E. Merrick
Dodd in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.21 Against the backdrop of the
Great Depression, these scholars squared off over the wisdom of giving
corporate managers discretion to direct economic resources toward social goals.

19
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 440–41, 449. A number of commentators argued this
declaration was premature. See, e.g., Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535 (2006); Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom—For Whom?: Feminist Legal
Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 88 (2004) (“T]he death announcement
for the history of corporate law is now revealed as premature.”).
20
See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 22 (indicating that the Hobby Lobby decision endorses the idea
that corporations may legally pursue goals other than profits).
21
A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) [hereinafter
Berle, Corporate Powers]; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, A Note].
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Worried that managers would advance their own interests, Berle advocated a
stringent duty to serve shareholders alone.22
In response, Dodd laid the conceptual foundation for what we now call
“corporate social responsibility.” While conceding that managers needed
taming, Dodd argued that they should serve the interests of the public as well as
those of shareholders and could deploy corporate funds for that purpose “without
thereby being guilty of a breach of trust.”23 According to Dodd, the public—and
even the executive ranks of America’s most significant companies—
increasingly took the view that nominally private business corporations had a
“social service” function in addition to their economic function.24
Over time Dodd and Berle switched positions.25 But the two major axes of
their debate remained stable: shareholder primacy versus stakeholder
governance, profits versus social purposes.
The initial disagreement is over whose interests should be primary—
shareholders or a broader set of stakeholders.26 Contemporary corporate law
scholarship tends to favor shareholder primacy.27 Perhaps the most forceful
judicial statement of shareholder primacy came in 1919 in Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., when the Michigan Supreme Court declared that “[a] business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”28 Nearly
one hundred years later, the Delaware Court of Chancery struck a similar note
in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, explaining that directors must
“promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of stockholders.”29 These

22
See Berle, A Note, supra note 21, at 1368–69 (noting corporate managers act in their own interest “to
take what each can get”); Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 21, at 1065–73 (arguing the corporation’s power
to amend its charter and to transfer stock should be used only to protect the interests of all shareholders).
23
Dodd, supra note 21, at 1161; see id. at 1147–48 (calling “undesirable” “the view that business
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders”).
24
See Dodd, supra note 21, at 1148, 1154–55 (extensively quoting remarks of Owen D. Young and
Gerard Swope, both high-ranking executives at the General Electric Company).
25
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954) (“The argument has
been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”).
26
Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, supra note10, at 108 (arguing that policies favoring
all stakeholders can be detrimental), with Martin Lipton, Professor Bebchuk’s Errant Attack on Stakeholder
Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (March 4, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
03/04/professor-bebchuks-errant-attack-on-stakeholder-governance/ (arguing for the adoption of stakeholder
governance).
27
See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (2018)
(“Despite persistent criticism, the idea of shareholder primacy has been widely accepted.”).
28
170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
29
16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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cases are taught as blackletter law in classrooms across the country.30 Many of
the nation’s leading corporate law scholars carry the banner of shareholder
primacy31—a position one of us has defended in previous work.32
Proponents of stakeholder governance challenge this consensus on both
legal and normative grounds. As a legal matter, critics contend that corporate
law does not contain any requirement to maximize shareholder wealth. Dodge
was decided long ago, in a relatively insignificant jurisdiction for corporate law,
and has rarely been relied on.33 eBay, they say, was the product of an overzealous
trial court dealing with the conceptually distinct problem of minority
shareholder oppression.34 And, outside of Delaware, thirty-three states have
passed constituency statutes, which explicitly invite directors to consider
stakeholder interests.35 Another view contends that regardless of whether there
is a technical fiduciary duty to shareholders, the business judgment rule insulates
corporate directors from any kind of wealth-maximization mandate.36
As a normative matter, these scholars argue that shareholder primacy leads
to a host of pernicious consequences. Corporate managers focus on the short
term to the detriment of the long term.37 They become blindered to the morally
30
See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER H. KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 284–86 (5th ed. 2016); WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND CORPORATIONS
220–24 (10th ed. 2018).
31
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 10.
32
See Nelson, The Trouble with Corporate Conscience, supra note 8 (defending shareholder primacy as
a normative matter); Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, supra note 7 (defending shareholder primacy as a legal
matter).
33
See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166–67
(2008).
34
See Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate
Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 623 n.194 (2018) (comparing Dodge and eBay).
35
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93
S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 17); see also Elhauge, supra note 11, at 763 (noting that over
thirty states had passed constituency statutes at that time).
36
See M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again,
in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 37–39 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
37
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915 (2017)
(“[T]hose who manage active funds are likely to have compensation arrangements more based on the fund
family’s profits or short-term returns than the long-term returns of the funds they manage.”); Martin Lipton,
Steven A. Rosenblum, Sabastian V. Niles, Sara J. Lewis & Kisho Wantabe, The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for
an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable
Long-Term Investment and Growth, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/
AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf (warning that focusing on short-term gains is detrimental to the economy
because of the lack of investment in future-looking projects); Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder
Primacy,” 2 ACCT., ECON., & L. 1, 12–13 (2012) (proposing the board of directors of a company should be given
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compelling interests of other corporate participants.38 Equality and distributive
justice face ill effects.39 In 1932, Merrick Dodd labeled shareholder primacy
“undesirable.”40 In 2012, Lynn Stout put a sharper edge on the point: it was “the
dumbest idea in the world.”41
The battle over shareholder primacy is about whose interests should come
first—or, as Dodd put the question—“[f]or whom are corporate managers
trustees?”42 That question is tightly linked to, but distinct from, a second
question—what purposes are corporations supposed to serve?
On the conventional view, the only socially legitimate goal of corporations
is financial wealth—they are supposed to make as much money as possible
within the bounds of the law. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton
Friedman put it, managers betrayed their principals and became “unadulterated
socialis[ts]” if they considered wider social goals.43 Put somewhat less
tendentiously, when managers promote values other than shareholder wealth,
they place a “tax” on shareholders, diverting other people’s money to their own
pet projects.44
Contemporary scholars of law and economics largely subscribe to
Friedman’s view.45 The primary goal of corporate law accordingly becomes
discretion to “pursue business strategies that preserve long term value, even if these strategies don’t produce
immediate gains in share price”).
38
See, e.g., William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation:
Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 97, 102–03 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie
eds., 3d ed. 1988) (noting managers are often compelled to “balanc[e] the multiple claims of conflicting
stakeholders” with the caveat that “there will surely be times when one group will benefit at the expense of
others”); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary
Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1201 (1991) (explaining how corporate restructurings
meant to increase short-term cash returns worked to the detriment of employees, many of whom were
unexpectedly laid off).
39
See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 153–85 (2006); Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age,
2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4 (2008).
40
Dodd, supra note 21, at 1147–48.
41
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 3–6 (2012) (endorsing Jack Welch’s quote).
42
See Dodd, supra note 21.
43
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-thesocial-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html.
44
See id.
45
See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 21, 29 (3d ed. 2017). They reject, however, Friedman’s outdated idea that managers were literally
employed by shareholders. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
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reducing the costs of misalignment between the financial interests of
shareholders and those of corporate managers who serve as their economic
agents—the “agency-cost” problem that all but occupies the field of corporate
law today.46
By contrast, for CSR proponents, corporations can—and should—be free to
promote a wide variety of other human values. Howard Bowen—sometimes
called the “father of corporate social responsibility”47—argued that businesses
must be judged by their “demonstrable contribution to the general welfare.”48
Since the end of the 1990s, the rhetoric, and perhaps the practice, of CSR has
been mainstream among business corporations.49
Now, to be clear, both sides agree that corporations can further
environmental, social, or labor goals—the stuff of corporate public relations.
Even Friedman would encourage managers to take any legally permissible steps
that increase value.50 But, from the conventional point of view, managers may
pursue only those social initiatives that strive toward shareholder wealth.51
Doing well by doing good, however, is not corporate social responsibility.
Corporate social responsibility instead indicates that managers can (and should)
attempt to further societal, labor, or environmental goals in ways that do not
advance—or may even impede—shareholder wealth maximization. And it is
this definition of CSR that we, like other scholars, use here.52

STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991).
46
The foundational article on agency-cost analysis is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See
Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2013)
(stating the agency-cost approach developed by Jensen and Meckling “remains the dominant framework of
analysis for corporate law and corporate governance today”).
47
Archie V. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. &
SOC’Y 268, 270 (1999).
48
HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 52 (2013) (originally published
1953).
49
David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 262–77 (2008)
(demonstrating that in the 1990s, corporations came to invest in CSR guidelines, initiatives, and education
programs in business schools); Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1566–67
(2018) (compiling examples of corporations engaged in CSR); Elhauge, supra note 11 (showing how
corporations do, can, and should sacrifice profits in the public interest).
50
Friedman, supra note 43.
51
See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8, 10,
52–53 (2008); Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 10.
52
See, e.g., C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 80–81 (2002) (observing that corporate
social responsibility in debates throughout the twentieth century meant challenging the idea of an overriding
notion of shareholder primacy in favor of employee- and community-oriented decisions).
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The CSR debate has been revived in the new contexts presented by hedge
fund activism, unlimited corporate political spending, and the growth of
institutional investors,53 but that revival tends to follow well-worn paths. What
is new is that modern debates involving the social responsibilities of
corporations have spilled over into controversies about religious exemptions for
business corporations.
B. Linking CSR to Corporate Religious Exemptions
The century-long debate over corporate social responsibility received a
major jolt in 2014. That year, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the
Supreme Court decided the question of whether for-profit corporations could
exercise religion.54 Some prominent scholars argued that the Court had affirmed
the core principles of CSR even as it granted a religious exemption to a for-profit
business.55 Many supporters of religious exemptions were bolder, claiming that
CSR advances the case for an expansive range of corporate religious
exemptions.56
Hobby Lobby pitted two major pieces of federal legislation against each
other.57 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires large employers to provide
their employees with insurance coverage for a variety of contraceptive services
with no cost-sharing.58 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), on the
other hand, offers a vehicle for religious objectors to claim exemptions from
federal law.59 Dozens of businesses challenged the contraceptive mandate,
claiming that its enforcement would impermissibly burden their sincere religious
beliefs.60

53
For the social consequences of hedge fund activism, see generally Strine, supra note 37, at 1874, 1919,
1934–56. For background on corporate political spending, see Lucian Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., James D.
Nelson & Roberto Tallarita, The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1
(2020). For issues concerning large institutional investors, see John C. Coates IV, The Future of Corporate
Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 (working manuscript at 2–3, 5–6, 13–14, 19);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 640, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782814.
54
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 712 (2014).
55
See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 4.
56
See infra notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
57
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 701.
58
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (4) (2012).
59
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
60
See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2015) (discussing
cases); Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, supra note 7, at 1566.
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As the litigation proceeded, the analogy between CSR and corporate
religious exemption began to take off. While CSR remains a minority position
in corporate law literature, advocates of religious exemption recognized its
broader social appeal. On the op-ed pages, Mary Ann Glendon contended that
CSR and corporate claims for religious exemption were normatively
indistinguishable aspects of exercising conscience.61 An amicus brief argued
that failure to recognize free exercise of a for-profit corporation would result in
“a significant weakening of the structures that undergird corporate social
responsibility.”62 Just as Coca-Cola could seek to save polar bears, so too must
Hobby Lobby be free to deny contraception.63
The Supreme Court ultimately held that for-profit corporations were eligible
to claim religious exemptions from general laws and granted some of them an
exemption from the contraceptive mandate.64 In so doing, the Court added its
own take on corporate social responsibility.65 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito
observed that corporations routinely support charitable causes, including
environmental protection and humanitarian aid.66 It followed that “[i]f for profit
corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason
why they may not further religious objectives as well.”67
In an influential article, Lyman Johnson and David Millon declared Hobby
Lobby an unambiguous validation of corporate social responsibility.68 As the
first intervention by the nation’s highest court in the decades-long debates over
corporate social responsibility, the opinion was “a landmark in corporate law,”
they said.69 It affirmed the authority of corporations to pursue socially
responsible objectives.70 Those objectives, as they put it, could take the form of
“voluntary actions that exceed legal mandates, whether motivated by religion or
by other philosophical, ethical, or social policy convictions.”71
61
See Mary Ann Glendon, Free Businesses to Act with Conscience, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 8, 2013),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/12/08/should-business-have-conscience/cK6o6G6dwrWeRJjk1u
PVYM/story.html.
62
Brief for 9 Academic Institutions and 27 Comparative Law and Religion Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 1011 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356),
2014 WL 334444 (U.S.) at *26.
63
Id. at *33.
64
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 690–91 (2014).
65
See id. at 712.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 22.
69
See id.
70
See id. at 2–3, 22 (“Only with legal freedom is corporate social responsibility even possible.”).
71
Id. at 30.
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Johnson and Millon were not alone in their assessment. Brett McDonnell,
for example, praised Hobby Lobby as affirming “an idea that resonates with the
(generally left-of-center) corporate social responsibility movement.”72 Thomas
Berg also endorsed that view, noting “the connection between recognizing
businesses’ religious freedom rights and affirming the premises of corporate
social responsibility.”73 And Holly Fernandez Lynch and Gregory Curfman
argued that Hobby Lobby’s decision to deny contraceptive coverage to female
employees was akin to, and supported by, corporate social responsibility.74
More generally, a variety of church-state and corporate law experts explicitly
connected corporate social responsibility and corporate religious exemptions. In
the months before Hobby Lobby, Mark Rienzi argued that because for-profit
businesses could take socially conscious action “based on ethical, philosophical,
and moral commitments,” they could not be precluded from claiming Free
Exercise or RFRA exemptions based on religious beliefs.75 Alan Meese and
Nathan Oman agreed, invoking a variety of socially responsible business
policies in support of corporate religious exemptions.76 Likewise, Ronald
Colombo argued that “corporate religious liberty fosters a more robust approach
to corporate social responsibility.”77
Some commentators were so puzzled by the failure to recognize this
supposed symmetry that they could only chalk it up to ignorance or religious
animus. On this account, opposition to Hobby Lobby revealed liberals’
ideological “blind-spot.”78 Likewise, failure to link CSR to religious exemptions
exposed an “unsettling” and “pernicious” hypocrisy: “[T]hat corporations
should be encouraged to act conscientiously with respect to protection of sea
life, but are ridiculed as being out of bounds when their conscience is the
religiously-motivated protection of human life.”79
72
McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, supra note 5, at 780; see also Michele Benedetto
Neitz, Hobby Lobby and Social Justice: How the Supreme Court Opened the Door for Socially Conscious
Investors, 68 SMU L. REV. 243, 262 (2015) (“The Court’s reasoning undermined decades of corporate focus on
profits and shareholder wealth, providing a unique opportunity for corporate social responsibility activists and
investors.”).
73
Berg, supra note 2.
74
See Lynch & Curfman, supra note 2, at 154–59.
75
Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 59, 84 (2013).
76
See Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm:
Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 291–92 (2014).
77
Colombo, supra note 5, at 840.
78
Brett McDonnell, Ideological Blind Spots: The Left on Hobby Lobby, STAR TRIB. (July 10, 2014, 7:01
PM), http://www.startribune.com/ideological-blind-spots-the-left-on-hobby-lobby/266684261/.
79
Brett Scharffs, Our Fractured Attitude Towards Corporate Conscience 17 (Mar. 12, 2014) (unpublished
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The stakes of this debate go well beyond Hobby Lobby and the contraceptive
mandate. Just a few years after Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court expanded the
reach of corporate rights, taking as granted that corporations can claim
exemptions not only under RFRA, but under the Constitution as well.80 In 2019,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Arizona Supreme Court
became the first courts to hold that for-profit corporations have free exercise
rights to refuse service contrary to public accommodations antidiscrimination
law.81 At least two justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch, agree.82 At the same time, corporate religion is ascendant in lobbying
groups and calls for religious integralism, according to which faith and business
combine and generally applicable law should cede.83
In Parts II–IV, we dispute the claimed congruence between CSR and
corporate religious exemptions. At the most basic level, as Part II explains,
corporate social responsibility involves exceeding regulatory minimums
whereas corporate religious exemptions clash with legal obligations. More
fundamentally, as Parts III and IV argue, a deeper asymmetry emerges between

manuscript) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445680); see Stephen Bainbridge,
The Odd Inconsistencies in the Corporate Law Professor Brief in the Mandate Cases, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Jan. 29, 2014, 5:23 PM), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/01/the-oddinconsistencies-in-the-corporate-law-professor-brief-in-the-mandate-cases.html (“[A]dvocates of . . . [CSR]
argue that corporations should consider the good of society when making corporate decisions. Except it seems
when Catholic and other religiously-motivated shareholders want the corporation to address the social issue of
abortion.”); see also ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, AN EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO FAITH IN THE WORKPLACE:
LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHRISTIANS WHO OWN A BUSINESS 1 (2015) (“[W]hile some business owners are
cheered and commended when they blend certain beliefs and work, Christian business owners are often derided
and denigrated, and sometimes face legal challenges, when they do the same.”); McDonnell, supra note 78
(arguing corporate religious exemptions are “grounded in corporate social responsibility,” but that it is “[t]oo
bad so many liberals don’t seem to realize it.”); Keith Paul Bishop, 44 Law Professors Make a Case Against
Corporate Social Responsibility, ALLEN MATKINS: CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. (Feb. 10, 2014),
https://www.calcorporatelaw.com/2014/02/44-law-professors-make-a-case-against-corporate-social-responsibility
(“If corporations can’t have religious beliefs, then it follows that they can’t believe in climate change, sustainable
investment or any other beliefs embraced by the corporate social responsibility movement.”); Lyman Johnson,
Hobby Lobby, A Landmark Corporate Law Decision, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (July 2, 2014),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07/lyman-johnson-hobby-lobby-a-landmark-corporatelaw-decision.html (“I found it odd to see these companies opposed by so many corporate progressives. . . . But
take comfort: although progressives lost the Hobby Lobby battle, they gained (accidently) an ironic victory on
the all-important corporate purpose war.”).
80
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).
81
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 755, 758 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v.
City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz. 2019).
82
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742–43 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
83
James D. Nelson, Corporate Disestablishment, 105 VA. L. REV. 595, 60003 (2019) (describing these
arguments).
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the political economies presumed and sustained by corporate social
responsibility and corporate religious exemptions.
II. AN OBVIOUS INCONGRUENCE
Corporate religious exemptions defy the most basic assumption about
corporate social responsibility—namely, that the corporation must comply with
existing regulatory requirements. As we have explained, corporate law scholars
disagree about whether corporations can—or should—go above those legal
requirements in pursuit of something other than shareholders’ economic
interests. But there is wide consensus across the ideological spectrum that
existing regulatory frameworks establish a floor beneath which socially
responsible corporate behavior may not fall.84
This requirement to stay within the bounds of the law is baked into business
corporation statutes, which typically permit corporations to be organized only to
pursue “lawful” business or purposes.85 And while the ultra vires doctrine has
receded over the years, corporate law has retained an emphasis on lawful
pursuits as a floor for corporate behavior.86 As Elizabeth Pollman has explained,
by imposing mandatory duties of obedience to public authority, corporate law
acknowledges the importance of the rule of law and the implicit social contract
between the state and corporate entities.87 It assumes a “binary, on-off” between
behaviors inside the rules of the game or outside their scope.88
84
See, e.g., Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 47, at 283–84 (noting that definitions of
CSR “alluded to businesses’ responsibility to make a profit, obey the law, and ‘go beyond’ these activities”);
David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 67 (1979) (discussing the
“extralegislative” nature of CSR); Keith Davis, The Case for and Against Business Assumption of Social
Responsibilities, 16 ACAD. MGMT. J. 312, 313 (1973) (“[S]ocial responsibility begins where the law ends.”);
JOSEPH W. MCGUIRE, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 144 (1963) (“The idea of social responsibilities supposes that the
corporation has not only economic and legal obligations but also certain responsibilities to society which extend
beyond these obligations.”); Dodd, supra note 21, at 1161 (calling for the “development of business ethics which
goes beyond the requirements of law.”); Hillary A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License 7 (June 13,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403706) (“[T]he freedom corporate actors
enjoy is subject to laws and regulations . . . .”).
85
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (West 2006) (“A corporation may be incorporated or
organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes . . . .”); see also Kent
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate
Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1316–17, 1317 n.121 (2001) (noting the
lawfulness restriction in the Model Business Corporation Act and the corporation codes of 47 states).
86
See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762–63 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the business judgment rule
does not protect directors who knowingly violate the law). See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate
Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2028–29 (2019) (exploring duty of good faith to comply
with external law and its legitimizing role for corporate law).
87
Pollman, supra note 86, at 202728.
88
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 711 (2019) (querying whether this
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Even the staunchest critics of corporate social responsibility take for granted
that corporations are bound by regulatory minimums. Milton Friedman—the
most prominent critical voice—made clear that corporate managers, in their
dogged pursuit of profits, had an absolute obligation to “stay[] within the rules
of the game.”89 Modern critics share this perspective.90
By contrast, the debate over corporate religious exemptions in the law and
religion literature has called for resistance to law. Ronald Colombo, for example,
argues that a business’s embrace of a religious identity is undermined or
rendered impossible by laws and regulations.91 The “robust understanding of
corporate social responsibility” that he propounds would allow corporations to
defy these laws in their religious interest.92 Amy Sepinwall is more troubled by
the idea that corporations can evade regulatory mandates, yet she too defends
the idea that religious conscience can supplant a business’s legal obligations.93
We are not the first to note that religious exemptions clash with corporate
social responsibility’s basic assumption of regulatory compliance. Before Hobby
Lobby was decided, for example, Anne Tucker observed that whereas
“[c]orporate social responsibility asks companies to do more than their
minimum legal obligations,” corporate religious objectors “are asking to do
less.”94 Even some proponents of corporate religious exemptions acknowledge
this incongruence.95 Alan Meese, for example, concedes that many practices
motivated by an owner’s religion confer no obvious benefit on others in society
“clear, binary, on-off, lawful or unlawful world that is implicitly reduced to a judgment of good or bad, inside
or outside the rules of the game” reflects the wide scope of corporate behavior).
89
Friedman, supra note 43.
90
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10.
91
Colombo, supra note 5, at 840.
92
Id. at 841.
93
Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby
Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 193844 (2015) (explaining that under governing standards for legal
complicity, Hobby Lobby’s exemption should have been denied).
94
Anne Tucker, More or Less?, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK (Feb. 26, 2014), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/02/more-or-less.html; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate
Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149, 170 (Micah
Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoe Robinson eds., 2016) (noting corporate exemptions are about “opting out,”
not about “doing more than the law requires, as is usually the case with corporate social responsibility”);
Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 69091 (2016) (arguing there is
tension between corporate law’s reliance on external regulation to protect stakeholder interests and allowing
businesses to opt out of those regulations); Catherine A. Hardee, Veil Piercing and the Untapped Power of State
Courts, 94 WASH. L. REV. 217, 236 (2019) (noting corporate religious exemptions “permit shareholders to
provide less for other corporate stakeholders and the general public than the law requires”).
95
Brett McDonnell, for example, recognizes the difference between “doing more than the law requires”
and “opting out of legal requirements.” McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, supra note 5, at 809.
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such that “any analogy to CSR would appear to be strained.”96 Yet, proponents
of corporate religious exemptions continue to rely on that strained analogy.97
None of our analysis is meant to suggest that corporate religious activity is
necessarily at odds with regulatory requirements. Corporations may express
religious messages or identity in a variety of ways. They may post religious text,
close on Sundays, or offer optional religious counseling.98 They may pay above
minimum wage and provide generous employee benefits. They may donate
money to charitable organizations with religious missions. But, to meet the most
basic requirement of corporate social responsibility, religious corporations may
not defy legal obligations.
One potential objection to our account is that we have misidentified the
proper legal baseline.99 A critic taking this tack might say that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) redefines what it means for a business to meet
its legal obligations. To borrow a phrase from Michael Stokes Paulsen, perhaps
“RFRA runs through” the entire federal code, such that religious objectors who
state a successful exemption claim were never constrained by the challenged
regulation in the first place.100 Alternatively, one might argue that the supremacy
of the Constitution means that asserting valid free exercise claims proves
compliance with legal duties, properly understood. If one were to accept this
conceptual framework, then there is no conflict between corporate religious
exemptions and regulatory compliance.
Parsing this objection in the context of the controversy over contraceptive
coverage illuminates its contours and, ultimately, its flaws. When it was first
promulgated in 2013, the contraceptive mandate applied to large employers with
96
Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Social Responsibility: A View from the Right,
CONGLOMERATE (Jul. 16, 2014), https://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/hobby-lobby-and-corporate-socialresponsibility-a-view-from-the-right.html.
97
McDonnell attempts to rescue the CSR analogy by asserting that liberal corporate lawyers and
conservative religious objectors both see corporations as allowing people to pursue “a shared vision of the
common good in ways that go beyond simply complying with the law.” McDonnell, supra note 5, at 809. This
observation, however, does not explain how it is that CSR supports corporate religious activity that falls below
regulatory minimums.
98
Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 24, 28 (2014); see Nelson, supra note 83, at 64748; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1745 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“He is not open on
Sundays, he pays his employees a higher-than-average wage, and he loans them money in times of need. Phillips
also refuses to bake cakes containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic messages, cakes criticizing God,
and cakes celebrating Halloween . . . .”).
99
We thank Stephanie Barclay for raising this objection in conversation.
100
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT.
L. REV. 249, 283 (1995).
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fifty or more full-time employees but contained an exemption for churches and
their integrated auxiliaries.101 Thus, in 2013, an incorporated church could
exclude contraception and be said to meet minimum legal requirements. A small
for-profit employer similarly would not be defying legal obligations if it did not
cover contraception. But large for-profit employers had a duty to include
contraception within employee health plans. The baseline objection suggests
that Hobby Lobby and the other large employers challenging the mandate were
in full compliance with the law when they refused to cover contraceptives—at
the moment their suit was filed and before the Supreme Court vindicated their
claims.
But as a functional matter, no one—including the plaintiffs—believed
failure to include contraception was complying with the regulatory
requirements. RFRA allows a plaintiff who does not wish to comply with law—
or is charged with its violation—an exemption if the law substantially burdens
their religious beliefs and is not the least-restrictive means to further a
compelling governmental interest.102 That the religious objection conflicts with
a legal duty is baked into RFRA.103 The logic of a corporate religious exemption
claim is not that corporate employers never had a valid legal obligation, but that
their religious liberty interests are weighty enough to preclude enforcement of
that obligation.
Religious exemptions, whether mandatory or permissive, have long been
characterized in this way. For example, Michael McConnell has argued that
“[t]he purpose of a religious accommodation is to relieve the believer—where it
is possible to do so without sacrificing significant civic or social interests—from
the conflicting claims of religion and society.”104 The government might
determine that “the balance between the exercise of religion and enforcement of
the law” tips in favor of free exercise, but the underlying law does not
disappear.105
101
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461
(Feb. 6, 2013) (proposing to exempt “an employer that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and referred
to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code,” which “refers to churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any
religious order”).
102
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(c) (2018).
103
See Michael A. Helfand, The Substantial Burden Puzzle, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–7 (2016);
Elizabeth Sepper, Substantiating the Burdens of Compliance, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 53 (2016).
104
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26 (1985).
105
See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2 (2000)
(describing the conventional way of understanding religious exemptions). This kind of exemption results from
what Frederick Schauer calls an “external failure,” where the legal rule’s background justification is overridden
by competing interests exogenous to the rule. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
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Consider how this dynamic of defeasibility might work in practice in light
of the Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.106 In Bostock,
the Court held that Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination
because of sex covers discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity.107 But in his opinion for the Court, Justice Gorsuch seemed to
invite claims for religious exemption, writing that “[b]ecause RFRA operates as
a kind of super statute, displacing the normal operation of other federal laws, it
might supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases.”108 Indeed, Harris
Funeral Homes—a for-profit business and another plaintiff before the Court—
had previously claimed entitlement to a corporate religious exemption from Title
VII.109 It sought to enforce sex-specific dress codes and bar a transgender
employee from acting as a funeral director.110 If its claim were to succeed, the
business would presumably remain subject to Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination. The corporate religious exemption would simply reflect the
overriding strength of the company’s religious liberty interest in one particular
application.
In sum, corporate social responsibility’s commitment to legal compliance
proves an awkward fit for corporations seeking to opt out of legal minimums
through religious exemptions. In the next two Parts, we argue that this initial and
obvious incongruence points to an overlooked and fundamental mismatch
between the political and economic orders imagined by corporate social
responsibility and corporate religious exemptions.

EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 118 (1991). For example, if a maximum
emissions law exempted a business spewing noxious gasses so that it could continue to employ local residents,
that exemption would be the result of an external failure. The air-quality justification would ultimately be
defeated by a competing social interest.
106
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
107
Id. at 1754.
108
Id.
109
Harris Funeral Homes was successful on its RFRA claim in the district court. See EEOC v. R.G. &
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841–42 (E.D. Mich. 2016). But that decision was reversed
by the Sixth Circuit. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 600 (6th Cir. 2018).
The company did not seek review of that RFRA holding in its certiorari petition. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754
(“Harris Funeral Homes did unsuccessfully pursue a RFRA-based defense in the proceedings below. In its
certiorari petition, however, the company declined to seek review of that adverse decision, and no other religious
liberty claim is now before us.”).
110
E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 840 (2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d
560 (2018).
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III. THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CSR
The political economy of CSR starts with the recognition that corporate
power poses a substantial threat to democratic governance and societal wellbeing. As section A explains, the solution CSR proposed was to make
corporations responsible to the public and set them in pursuit of the social values
of the democratic state. As section B demonstrates, CSR proponents argued that
a reasonable proxy for social values could be found in business regulations. On
this view, regulation served as a repository of democratic values, identifying
social obligations that responsible managers could pursue further.
Finally, and fundamentally, advocates of CSR advanced the view that
businesses, at least those of a certain size, were in a meaningful sense public, as
section C explains. As the very term corporate social responsibility implies,
corporations had to take an external orientation toward constituents within
society. They could not be treated as private entities to be subject only to contract
and economic regulation. From this perspective, the realms of the market and of
politics were not separate.
A. Corporate Power as a Dilemma for Democracy
For nearly a century, CSR proponents have treated unchecked corporate
power as an existential threat to democracy. Corporations threatened to rival—
and in some cases even eclipse—the influence of political states. As Dodd and
Berle began their debate, the Great Depression had exposed the democratic state
as weak, unable to anticipate crises and restrain corporate behemoths.
Businessmen, then-recently “celebrated as leaders of the nation,” had proven
fallible.111
Corporations had grown in size and no longer looked or acted like they once
had—a phenomenon that would continue over the twentieth century.112 By the
1950s, influential work by Adolf Berle and John Kenneth Galbraith, among
others, had concluded that the corporate landscape bore little resemblance to the
neoclassical model of a ruthlessly competitive economy.113 Concentration
among the nation’s largest businesses meant that prices were not a function of
competitive pressures, but instead were determined—or as Berle argued

111

KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST

THE

NEW DEAL 6

(2010).
112

For an argument that this trend continues today, see TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN
(2018).
See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 111, at 23.

THE NEW GILDED AGE
113
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“administer[ed]”—by corporate managers.114 For thinkers from Berle to
Galbraith to Vance Packard, these businesses presented unique dangers, both
economically and socially.115
First, the size and reach of corporate behemoths meant that they could
displace the state itself. As one commentator said in the 1970s, “the mother state
has virtually been replaced by the mother company; corporate power is no longer
private but has nearly pre-empted public power.”116 As Galbraith and sociologist
C. Wright Mills noted, the oligopolistic power of business posed a serious
challenge to democracy and representative government.117 This take seemed all
the more justified as the Cold War ended and globalization spawned
multinational corporations, profoundly altering the relationship between the
state of incorporation and its companies.118
Second, corporations could dominate and victimize consumers, employees,
and communities. As Berle and Dodd began their debate, “[t]he traditional
potency of the family, the church and the local community suddenly seemed
dwarfed by the sway of the giant corporations.”119 Corporations had intruded
into arenas traditionally viewed as private. They stood to supplant all other forms
of association to the detriment of human life and wellbeing. Over the decades,
concerns about corporate dominance expanded and shifted, from effects on
prices and economic stability to the imposition of social conformity and damage
to the environment.120
Theorists worried that in the absence of a meaningful change in corporate
practices, society would be left without adequate means and political structures
to hold businesses accountable. Corporate social responsibility developed as one
114

BERLE, supra note 25, at 25, 51.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 43,
47 (1952); see also Wells, supra note 52, at 101, 104 (observing that these thinkers would have disagreed on the
solution to the problem).
116
PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 111, at 191.
117
See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER
ELITE (1956).
118
See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002) (discussing failures of American legal framework for extraterritorial regulation
of multinational corporation activity).
119
ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 2 (1998).
120
See, e.g., Sarah A. Altschuller, An Attorney’s Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility and
Corporate Philanthropy, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW EXPECTATIONS
AND PARADIGMS 471, 475 (2014) (“In the subsequent decades, the emergence of multinational companies with
global markets and supply chains both reflected the weakening of ties between individual companies and specific
local communities and provoked advocacy seeking to counter the magnitude of corporate power.”).
115

SEPPERNELSON_12.15.21

2021]

12/16/2021 10:35 AM

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION OF CSR

241

mechanism to discipline corporate power. Proponents from Dodd onward took
the view that legal regulation was not the only tool to ensure that corporations
acted for the common good. Corporate managers could—and should—act
voluntarily for the benefit of society. The new era would judge businesses not
by profit maximization alone, but by their commitment to the public as well.121
For those most worried about democratic displacement, the chief concern
was restoring the state’s regulatory authority. Proponents embraced the view that
CSR might serve as a bulwark to prevent corporate power from overwhelming
democratic lawmakers.122 The state would take the lead in asserting public
priorities. In principle, big business would follow the state, which in turn would
ensure public accountability for the nation’s economic system.123
CSR also meant to offer a strategy to address power imbalances between the
corporation and its vulnerable stakeholders. Each period of debate shared the
premise that business corporations could not be left alone but required “legal
mechanisms that would lead corporate managers and directors to take into
account the needs not only of shareholders but [also] of workers, consumers, and
communities when making business decisions.”124 It was the corporation’s very
power over people that required it to assume social and political responsibility
in addition to its economic role.125
The political economy represented by CSR, then, was a form of restrained
capitalism. Capital had been socialized in large firms, and those firms would
have to be responsive to community needs to maintain their legitimacy.126 In
return for the continued pursuit of private profit, corporations would concede the
state’s authority and put their shoulders to the wheel in the direction set by the
state. While CSR’s emphasis on corporate self-regulation has been criticized for

121

See Wells, supra note 52, at 100.
For contemporary articulations of a similar view, see Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter,
Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens
United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 343–344 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for This Moment: The Enduring
Relevance of Adolf Berle’s Belief in a Global New Deal, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 267 268–69 (2019).
123
See ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 95–97 (1963).
124
Wells, supra note 52, at 79; see also Archie B. Carroll, A History of Corporate Social Responsibility:
Concepts and Practices, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 19, 25, 27–31,
33–34, 36 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (reviewing definitions of CSR).
125
PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER 337 (1950).
126
BERLE, supra note 25, at 188; see also Henry C. Wallich, The Case for Social Responsibility of
Corporations, in HENRY G. MANNE & HENRY C. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 37, 55 (1972) (“Recognition of social responsibilities may give the corporation the kind of
acceptance in the community that it needs if it plans to be an ongoing operation.”).
122
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diverting from more fundamental reforms,127 in principle it has always granted
the state prerogative over policy-setting in what one critic calls “inherent
statism.”128 While the actors were plural, the goals were unitary.
B. Advancing Regulatory Objectives
Corporations needed a public philosophy to match their role as “quasipolitical institutions.”129 CSR proponents settled on business regulations as a
reasonable proxy for social values that bore the hallmarks of democratic assent.
Through regulation, the state identified the obligations of corporations. These
same regulations could delineate the scope of firms’ social responsibility and
shape the direction of their voluntary efforts.
Business regulation, of course, sets the baseline beyond which socially
responsible actors go. Corporate law scholars agree that lawmakers should
protect various corporate and public constituencies.130 These regulations result
from a democratically legitimate process and can be assumed to require
corporate acts that serve society’s best interests.
The idea of CSR depended on the argument that the law often fails to set
regulatory minimums at an optimal level, such that consensus social goals go
unmet. As CSR theorists observed, typically a time-lag occurs between the
emergence of any social problem and its ultimate legal resolution through the
political process.131 That political process, moreover, is subject to numerous
defects that lead to suboptimal lawmaking, including the fact that corporations
frequently manipulate public sentiment132 and capture their regulators.133 And

127
Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1377 (2011) (observing that CSR is not “revolutionary, or even particularly
challenging to the status quo”).
128
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 858 (1997).
129
See BERLE, supra note 25, at 5.
130
See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 356–57 (2015) (discussing
the literature).
131
See CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
94107 (1975) (detailing many reasons why the law consistently fails to vindicate popular sentiments favoring
corporate regulation). See generally Elhauge, supra note 11, at 748–49 (explaining why legal regulation falls
short of social optimality). For a recent acknowledgement of this problem, see Mark R. Kramer, Coronavirus Is
Putting CSR to the Test, HARV. BUS. REV., (Apr. 1, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/coronavirus-is-puttingcorporate-social-responsibility-to-the-test (calling on corporations to take immediate action to blunt the harm to
employees because law will be slow).
132
See STONE, supra note 131, at 95.
133
See id. at 95–96, 107.
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even when the law does succeed in translating public sentiment into appropriate
corporate regulation, those regulations suffer from substantial
underenforcement.134
As their debates resurfaced throughout the twentieth century, CSR
proponents had ample evidence that these shortcomings were endemic—from
the social upheaval of the 1960s to the takeover wave in the 1980s to the
globalization of markets in the 1990s.135 Best-selling exposés of environmental
degradation and consumer dangers, such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and
Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed, uncovered the public impact of corporate
decisions.136 News of widespread corporate misconduct—from illicit payment
scandals to Penn Central’s failure—added fuel to the fire.137 With globalization,
transnational corporations committed labor abuses beyond the reach of their
domestic home states and global governance institutions.138 More recently, the
2008 global financial crisis and 2020 coronavirus pandemic highlighted the
chasm between ideal regulation and the status quo.139
Given regulatory deficiencies, CSR directed corporate managers to step up
and support public objectives.140 To exercise this responsibility, however,
corporate managers would have to anchor their judgments in something other
than personal inclination. As Berle described the concept, corporate
responsibility would reflect “[a] set of ideas, widely held by the community, and
134
See id. at 104. Wayne Norman explains that “governments often cannot keep up with credible
monitoring of many of their regulations—as we seem to learn every time unsafe food or medicines begin taking
a toll.” Wayne Norman, Business Ethics as Self-Regulation: Why Principles that Ground Regulations Should Be
Used to Ground Beyond-Compliance Norms as Well, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 43, 50 (2011).
135
Wells, supra note 52, at 81; see PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 111, at 150–51; Terry H. Anderson, The
New American Revolution: The Movement and Business, in THE SIXTIES: FROM MEMORY TO HISTORY 135, 174
(David Farber ed., 1994) (“From 1960 to the early 1970s, the sixties era, activists attacked and in some respects
changed America’s way of ‘doing business,’ a topic neglected by historians.”).
136
See Christopher Jensen, 50 Years Ago, ‘Unsafe at Any Speed’ Shook the Auto World, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/automobiles/50-years-ago-unsafe-at-any-speed-shookthe-auto-world.html.
137
See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSFORMED 101, 154 (2019).
138
See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 819, 819 (2007) (noting the UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights concluded that
“global governance has struggled for more than a generation to adjust to the expanding reach and growing
influence of transnational corporations”); Laurie E. Abbott, Integrating the Ruggie Guiding Principles into the
International Economic Community, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 261, 263 (2014) (describing the
development of UN guidelines for human rights and transnational corporations, which seek to influence behavior
but impose no legal obligations).
139
See K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 78–79 (2017); Adam J. Levitin, The
Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1991, 1993 (2014).
140
See Elhauge, supra note 11, at 783–96.
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often by the organization itself and the men who direct it, that certain uses of
power are ‘wrong,’ that is, contrary to the established interest and value system
of the community.”141 But how would corporations identify public objectives—
that shared “set of ideas”—to put them into practice?
Leading voices in business ethics and law came to take the view that
regulation would serve as the legitimating source and guidepost for CSR. As Lee
Preston and James Post explained, in addition to “the literal text of law and
regulation,” managers should follow “the broad pattern of social direction
reflected in public opinion, emerging issues, formal legal requirements, and
enforcement or implementation practices”—the spirit of the law.142
To explore the difference between the law’s letter and spirit, consider the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA obligates employers to pay a
minimum wage but suffers from Congress’s long failure to raise minimum
wages to reflect rising costs of living.143 And so, to showcase social
responsibility, a small newspaper corporation might raise worker pay, taking on
additional obligations to further the FLSA’s objective of ensuring adequate
wages. If instead, the corporation discovered and took advantage of the FLSA’s
exception for small newspapers,144 nobody would consider that action socially
responsible. It would not violate the letter of the law, but it would contravene its
spirit. Taking advantage of this exception does not further the background
justification for imposing obligations on corporations to pay minimum wages.145
It represents compliance, but not cooperation.146
141
ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 90 (1959).
142
Lee E. Preston & James E. Post, Private Management and Public Policy, 23 CAL. MGMT. REV. 56, 57
(1981) [hereinafter Private Management and Public Policy]; see also LEE E. PRESTON & JAMES E. POST,
PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 56–57 (1975)
(pioneering this argument). Even Thomas Jones, a skeptic of Preston and Post’s prescription, acknowledged that
it worked relatively well where policy exists and is clear. See Thomas M. Jones, Corporate Social Responsibility,
Revisited, Redefined, 22 CAL. MGMT. REV. 59, 62 (1980).
For an example, see Jeremy Moon & David Vogel, Corporate Social Responsibility, Government, and
Civil Society, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 31214 (discussing the ways in which the U.K.
government provides “a policy and institutional framework that stimulates companies to raise their performance
beyond minimum legal standards”).
143
29 U.S.C. § 206 (2018); Lorie Konish, It’s Been 12 Years Since the Last Federal Minimum Wage
Increase. Where Efforts to Raise the Pay Rate Stand, CNBC (July 16, 2021, 4:14 PM EDT) https://www.cnbc.
com/2021/07/16/where-efforts-to-raise-the-federal-minimum-wage-stand.html.
144
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(8) (2018).
145
Consistent with our account in Part II, this exemption instead responds to yet another form of “external
failure.” It permits the apparently stronger interest in keeping small newspapers in business to defeat the
background justification of ensuring minimum wages that still applies generally and continues to reflect the
government’s views of a floor for wages paid.
146
See, e.g., Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate Executive’s Social
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Grounding corporate social responsibility in legislative markers was said to
have at least two advantages. First, it offered some democratic legitimacy to
corporate efforts.147 The basic idea here was that regulation registers a judgment
about the social commitments of liberal democracies. By developing business
practices “‘higher’ or ‘more demanding’ than the actual regulations in force,”
corporate managers would carry out obligations consistent with the same logic
that justified existing regulations.148 In so doing, they would advance
government-indicated (but not mandated) corporate duties.
In recent years, corporate law scholars have picked up on this theme,
emphasizing the degree to which CSR and positive law have become imbricated.
For example, Elizabeth Pollman has explored Adolf Berle’s idea of “inchoate
law,” suggesting that recent calls for CSR’s revival stem from the same social
sources as business regulation.149 Lyman Johnson has argued along similar lines
that positive law and broader social views about corporate responsibility “are
not distinct, but intertwined.”150 Corporations align their voluntary CSR
practices and their compliance with regulations such that, Cheryl Wade
contends, “it is impossible to see where [law] ends and [CSR] begins.”151
The second advantage of identifying law as a proxy for society’s interests
was to answer critics’ epistemic objection to CSR. As critics point out, corporate
managers are hired for their business acumen and have no particular expertise
or ability to identify social consensus.152 By linking corporate efforts to
regulatory minimums, CSR proponents hoped to make the concept of
responsible behavior (somewhat) less subjective and open-ended. Corporations
would focus on a narrower social agenda than the state, targeting concerns
arising from their own operations and effects on society.153
Responsibilities with Regard to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 559–70 (2005) (drawing a contrast between social
duty and corporate compliance in the form of taking advantage of legal loopholes (allowing compliance with the
legal letter while violating social purpose), ambiguity, and underenforcement).
147
See Engel, supra note 84, at 33.
148
Norman, supra note 134, at 44; see Joseph Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 533, 534, 536 (2006).
149
Elizabeth Pollman, Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law: Berle’s Vision of Limits on Corporate
Power, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 620 (2019).
150
Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate
Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1137–38 (2012).
151
Cheryl L. Wade, Effective Compliance with Antidiscrimination Law: Corporate Personhood, Purpose
and Social Responsibility, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1187, 1199–1200 (2017).
152
For an influential statement of this view, see Engel, supra note 84, at 4, 62.
153
Preston & Post, Private Management and Public Policy, supra note 142, at 61. As Preston and Post
explained, corporations had primary functions—like managing their supply chains and manufacturing products,
as well as employing workers—and secondary or consequential effects on the wider community. A business’s
social obligation, Preston and Post argued, derived from its line of business and required consideration of people
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Even then, as critics note, the public policy underlying democratic
lawmaking can be indeterminate.154 This is a fair critique of the CSR project.
Many forms of democratic lawmaking—including regulation of businesses—
result from legislative compromise and horse-trading, rather than
straightforward implementation of particular social interests. Governments set
multiple goals, which may conflict with one another.
While difficult cases may arise, for our purposes it suffices that demands for
religious exemptions in particular have tended to occur against a relatively
coherent statutory and regulatory backdrop. Consider Montana’s Hutterite
colonies, religious corporations that are also market leaders in the state’s
agricultural, construction, and manufacturing industries.155 They argued that the
Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment exempted them from paying for
workers’ compensation insurance.156 There was no confusion or indeterminacy
about what the regulatory framework required. Likewise, the contraceptive
mandate—promulgated as part of the Women’s Health Amendment—had a
well-defined and well-understood justification of protecting the health and
equality interests of women in the workforce.157
To be sure, the legal regimes governing antidiscrimination law and employee
insurance coverage are complex. But the signals they send to managers about a
corporation’s obligations tend not to conflict.
Moreover, its proponents would say corporate social responsibility contains
a corrective against corporations taking the wrong path. The direction of
corporate decisions and externality regulation must align, or the state will act.
If, for example, a socially responsible corporate manager taking cues from
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations pursues “too much”
safety or not enough, then democratic lawmakers will adjust their regulatory
efforts.
primarily or secondarily related to the firm. Id.
154
Jones, supra note 142, at 63.
155
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Lab. & Indus.,
291 P.3d 1231 (Mont. 2012) (No. 12-1191), 2013 WL 4495964, *1, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 817 (2013).
156
Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 291 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Mont. 2012), cert.
denied, 571 U.S. 817 (2013).
157
Some advocates referred to being a woman as a preexisting condition. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H1719
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 2010) (statement of Rep. Lynn Woolsey); see also 155 CONG. REC. S12026 (daily ed. Dec.
1, 2009) (statement of Sen. Barbara Mikulski) (introducing women’s health amendment “to save our lives, make
sure our lives are not impaired as we get older and, at the same time, be able to save money”); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 737 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he mandate serves the
Government’s compelling interest in providing insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of
female employees, coverage that is significantly more costly than for a male employee.”)
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This observation of hydraulic pressure has a long pedigree. In his 1950s
writings, Berle warned managers that if their constituencies are unsatisfied with
corporate acts, “they will go to the political state for solution.”158 CSR took place
in the shadow of regulation. Ultimately, the democratic community—which is
to say the public—would determine the bounds of responsible corporate activity.
C. The Publicness of Business Corporations
Central to the theory of corporate social responsibility was the concept of
the corporation as public. Publicness worked in two, interrelated ways. First, the
theory instructed, corporations performed social as well as economic functions.
Setting itself in opposition to the neoclassical model of the corporation as a
purely private creature of competitive markets, corporate social responsibility
demanded a turn toward a wider set of stakeholders. Second, power transformed
corporations into quasi-states. Politics and the market proved fluid, rather than
divided.
1. From Private Property to the Public’s Concern
Throughout CSR’s history, the neoclassical model of the firm has stood as a
foil. This conception sees firms as private concerns and, in turn, relegates the
state to a peripheral role, principally concerned with developing regulations to
combat rare market failures.159 On this neoclassical view, which took off in the
1980s largely through the work of law and economics scholars Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, forces of market competition serve as the
primary, if not exclusive, form of discipline on corporations and their
managers.160
Corporate social responsibility required rejecting these private conceptions
of the firm. In his initial intervention, Dodd argued that the public-private line
had moved such that an increasing number of nominally private businesses were
“affected with a public interest.”161 The corporation had become a public
enterprise.
Developments within corporate law spurred and interacted with Dodd’s
reconceptualization of the public and private. Before the twentieth century, the

158
BERLE, supra note 25, at 56; see Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137, 139 (2011) (observing this hydraulic pressure from communities on corporations).
159
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 38.
160
For the culmination of a decade of their work, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45.
161
Dodd, supra note 21, at 1149.
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corporation was considered the property of the shareholders held equitably,
more like a private partnership than modern business corporation.162 Courts and
commentators would have been confident that duties of directors ran
unquestionably to shareholders.163 But by the early twentieth century, the thenrecent separation of ownership and control had transferred power from a
corporation’s “owners” to professional managers. Limited liability and everlarger numbers of shareholders meant a unity between business owner and
business could no longer be presumed.164 This called for major adjustments to
the picture of business corporations as merely conduits to private gain. Instead,
“the corporate person would have the option of serving several masters.”165
As Berle came around to Dodd’s perspective, he too recognized the
enlargement of corporate constituencies. Large corporations had “outgrown the
‘incorporated partnership’ phase,” such that directors were “no longer merely
stewards . . . for their stockholders,” but were “also stewards for the employed
personnel, for customers and suppliers, and indeed for that section of the
community affected by their operations.”166 While shareholders merited a fair
rate of return, corporate law should not bar fair wages, honest prices, and publicinterested acts.
Business leaders and educators advanced a vision of public-minded
managers as well. Famed management theorist Peter Drucker, for example,
argued that “[e]ven the most private of private enterprises is an organ of society
and serves a social function.”167 David Rockefeller, another proponent of CSR,
emphasized the transformation of corporate norms from “the old concept that
the owner of a business had a right to use his property as he pleased” to “the
belief that ownership carries certain binding social obligations.”168
Over time, the political stakes crystallized in corporate law. One specific
manifestation was the enactment of constituency statutes. As hostile takeovers
162
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
261, 266–68 (1992).
163
Id.
164
See Berle, Power Without Property, supra note 141, at 6064 (describing the historical process by
which shareholders were alienated from their role as property owners).
165
Wells, supra note 115, at 93 (describing separation of ownership and control as a wedge to consider
other constituencies); see also Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001) (describing CSR as a “subset” of solutions to the
problem of separation of ownership from control).
166
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958).
167
PETER F. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 331 (Butterworth-Heinemann ed. 2007)
(originally published 1955).
168
Wells, supra note 52, at 100.
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dramatically spiked in the 1980s, managers faced the prospect that if returns to
shareholders lagged, corporate raiders waited around the corner to make a tender
offer and boot them out of office. As a consequence, non-shareholder
constituencies—including local communities where corporations operated—
had to worry that managers would take corporate actions that transferred wealth
to shareholders.169 As a corrective, progressive corporate law scholars advanced
constituency statutes to “expand the definition of public responsibilities” of
these non-state, nominally private entities.170 Like their predecessors, these
scholars united in rejecting the idea that corporations could be modeled as
voluntary private arrangements.171 As Lawrence Mitchell noted, echoing early
theorists, the corporation had become “a public institution with public
obligations.”172
The public obligation of the socially responsible corporation thus stood in
contrast to its pursuit of shareholders’ private interests. As Einer Elhauge
explains, CSR describes “cases where managers are sacrificing corporate profits
in a way that confers a general benefit on others, as opposed to conferring the
sorts of financial benefits on themselves, their families, or friends that courts
police under the duty of loyalty.”173 To be socially responsible, corporations had
to act in the interest of a wider public.
2. The Firm-State Analogy
If large business corporations were not private property or nexuses of private
contracts, then how should theorists and the public approach them? To
proponents of corporate social responsibility, the economic dominance—and
resulting political and social clout—of big corporations indicated that they were
political creatures. Size and concentration had transformed corporations into

169
CHEFFINS, supra note 137, at 155–218; see also Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987) (discussing the takeover debate).
170
See Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1673, 1691 (1993).
171
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, at xiv (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (“Each of the scholars whose
work is presented starts from the premise that it is no longer reasonable (if ever it was) to treat the corporation
as a purely private mechanism . . . .”); see, e.g., Theresa Gabaldon, Experiencing Limited Liability, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 110, 130; Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 35, 69; Marleen A. O’Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant
Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 219, 235–36.
172
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Preface to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 171, at xiii.
173
Elhauge, supra note 11, at 744.
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“private governments.”174 Business and national affairs had merged, which
meant that corporations needed their own political philosophy.175
Critics and advocates of CSR alike agreed on the political nature of CSR’s
conceptual structure. CSR theorists thought that the nature of modern
corporations required some form of political accountability. Berle and Means,
for example, anticipated that eventually corporate managers would “develop
into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various
groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream
on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity”—the firm would
operate in essence as administrative agency of the democratic state.176 CSR
would implant a political mechanism firmly inside the corporation.
Critics instead resisted granting corporations a political role. Milton
Friedman did so on the ground that politics was reserved to elected
representatives.177 In the 1990s, Stephen Bainbridge likewise critiqued CSR for
deputizing corporate managers to accept a political function and, worse, he said,
to further a public orthodoxy.178 Bainbridge identified the longstanding
structural affinity between CSR and the political state and argued that CSR
misplaced the public-private line.179
In the view of CSR proponents, the realm of the market and the realm of
politics could not be held apart. By supplementing the state’s objectives,
corporations were said to function as allies of the regulatory state. In a debate
with CSR critic Henry Manne, Henry Wallich described corporations as
providing “[a]ppropriate support” to legislative efforts addressing “corporate
impact on the environment and on society.”180 According to Wallich, CSR
would cover a range of activities where government and corporation, working
in complementary fashion, can best achieve social objectives. Through CSR,
corporations would collaborate with government leaders and contribute to
furthering national goals.181
174
RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 17 (1976)
(discussing the views of Berle and his contemporaries); see also RICHARD EELLS, THE GOVERNMENT OF
CORPORATIONS 10–13 (1962) (expressing similar views).
175
See BERLE, supra note 25, at 168–69.
176
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 356 (1932).
177
See Friedman, supra note 43.
178
Bainbridge, supra note 128, at 890.
179
Id. at 903.
180
Wallich, supra note 126, at 54, 5960 (suggesting corporations should have a duty to “engage
constructively with state and non-state regulatory processes”).
181
See id.
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The relationship, moreover, was one not of reluctant compliance with
authority, but of mutual cooperation toward common goals.182 As historians
have shown, two world wars, the Great Depression, and the Cold War fight
against communism created a public expectation that businesses would
participate in national programs.183 Capturing this spirit, President Eisenhower
“counted heavily on corporate ‘statesmanship’ and business community selfawareness to execute a political agenda oriented around restraint, patience, and
moderation.”184 Likewise, in 1966, President Johnson relied on large businesses
as partners in his campaign to fight inflation.185
Those most sympathetic to corporations envisioned a world of corporate
managers engaging in statesmanship.186 Berle, for example, hoped that
attributing responsibilities to corporations would avoid nationalization and
maintain a vibrant capitalist economy.187
Wallich went further, expressing a preference for corporate implementation
of public policy. He argued that CSR had the benefit of “shifting from the public
to the private sector activities that should be performed with maximum economy
rather than maximum bureaucracy, [which] fits into the design of a pluralistic
society seeking a high degree of decentralization.”188
Indeed, some modern accounts went so far as to describe corporate social
responsibility as a form of delegated government.189 The delegation was
typically thought to be implicit—the political state, on this view, was the primary
actor in assuring that businesses act responsibly. Socially responsible

182
See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 104 (2008) (“Berle widened the scope of the duty so that
directors could not only address and comply with a broad, new set of government-specified rules, but also be
cooperative participants in a common enterprise with the regulators.”).
183
Kim McQuaid, Corporate Liberalism in the American Business Community, 1920–1940, 52 BUS. HIST.
REV. 342, 349 (1978); Bert Spector, “Business Responsibilities in a Divided World”: The Cold War Roots of
the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 9 ENTER. & SOC’Y 314, 315 (2008).
184
CHEFFINS, supra note 137, at 97.
185
Id. at 99.
186
See Adolf A. Berle, Foreword, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, at ix (Edward S. Mason
ed., 1959).
187
See id. at 188 (“Corporate managements, like others, knowingly or unknowingly, are constrained to
work within a frame of surrounding conceptions which in time impose themselves.”).
188
Wallich, supra note 126, at 57.
189
See, e.g., Jeffrey Smith, Navigating Our Way Between Market and State, 29 BUS. ETHICS Q. 127, 132
(2018) (“[W]hen states are weak or otherwise underdeveloped[,] corporations assume the obligations of the state
to administer justice . . . .”); see also CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON, PUBLIC CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL
AUTHORITY OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES 107 (2012) (arguing that CSR is a form of political delegation from
weak states).
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corporations served as an adjunct, “shoring up legitimate states rather than
serving as their replacement.”190
***
CSR’s intellectual history reflects consistent themes. The power of the
corporation represents a threat to individual freedom and to democracy. The
solution is to ask corporations to voluntarily exceed regulatory minimums for
the benefit of society. The state, as CSR proponents tell it, sets the direction of
these efforts through values expressed in business regulation. The market
overlaps with the political in an ideal of pro-social, distinctly democratic
capitalism.
IV. THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS
Corporate religious exemptions discard the democratic commitments of
corporate social responsibility. As section A shows, proponents of exemptions
perceive the state as increasingly aggressive in regulating private life, and
religious businesses as a check on state power. The strong form of this
institutionalism envisions a landscape of plural authorities, where religious
institutions including for-profit corporations set their own agendas.
Religious exemptions become the tool to achieve this form of deep
pluralism. As section B demonstrates, in the eyes of their supporters,
corporations rightly resist regulation and co-optation. Through exemption, they
decline to participate in the projects of the democratic state.
As section C argues, religious exemptions for businesses differ in their
orientation from the “social” of CSR. At the heart of their concern are the
shareholders, who are presumed to have a unity of interest with the corporation.
Religious exemptions promote the primacy of these shareholders, albeit in moral
rather than financial terms.
A. Democracy as a Dilemma for Institutional Autonomy
Recall that, for theorists of CSR, the corporation posed a threat to a
weakened state and a vulnerable public that called out for redress.191 The
argument for religious exemptions describes a starkly different dynamic.

190
191

Smith, supra note 189, at 134.
See supra Part III.A.
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Proponents posit democratic decision-making as an impediment to religious
freedom. From this perspective, corporations can offer an antidote to state
orthodoxy and ensure spaces for plural visions of community and society.
Exemption proponents paint a picture of the state as a growing threat to
private moral ordering. The contraceptive mandate, for example, is described as
a product of extraordinary governmental overreach.192 The state, on this view, is
not a presumptively legitimate source of business regulation. Instead, it presents
a hovering threat to the natural rights and liberties enjoyed in private
associational settings.193
The solution—supporters of corporate religious exemptions say—is to cast
businesses as buffers against state power. On a common formulation, religious
corporate entities resist encroachments from the state into the private sphere.194
In their absence, it is said, government might “stifle[] the whole of human
life.”195 No room would remain for alternative sources of normative authority
on the morality of same-sex relationships or the binary nature of gender identity,
for example. Religious believers would be stuck in someone else’s nomos.196
Writing in 1997, during the last resurgence of the CSR debate, Stephen
Bainbridge foreshadowed this political economy.197 In his view, for-profit
corporations stood as mediating institutions between individuals and the state.198
A relatively hands-off government was preferred, as it would create the
associational space necessary for private groups to serve their own values, rather
than those of the state.199

192
See Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 98, at
28–29 (describing economic libertarian ethos of the religious liberty claims).
193
See Robin West, Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social
Contract, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 94, at 8–9 (making this point).
194
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917,
923–26 (2013) (noting this is the most common argument for religious institutionalism).
195
Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 79, 83 (2009) (“These institutions serve as a counterweight to the state, ensuring that it ‘may never
become an octopus, which stifles the whole of life.’” (quoting ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 96
(photo. reprint 1999) (1931))); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 199 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he autonomy of religious groups, both here in the United States and
abroad, has often served as a shield against oppressive civil laws.”).
196
Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV 4 (1983).
197
See Bainbridge, supra note 128, at 903. Bainbridge recognizes that this vision provides no support for
CSR. See id. at 883–84.
198
Id. at 884.
199
See id. at 892.
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This anti-government orientation proves a major contrast to the political
economy of CSR. Indeed, Bainbridge’s central critique of CSR—the “heart” of
his case—was that it replaced private associational virtues with a creeping form
of “statism.”200 CSR shifted the balance of social power away from private
arrangements and toward the state’s objectives.201 It thus weakened the private
sector’s ability to stand as an effective counterweight to state power.202
Other proponents of religious exemptions generally share this perspective.
For example, Alan Meese and Nathan Oman describe the need for a space free
of “the heavy hand of the state.”203 Others argue that religious commercial
entities must be sheltered from “the destructive force of taxation, the controlling
influence of government, and the backdoor regulation of government.”204
Corporations stand not as partners in the state’s project of protecting the
vulnerable, but as bastions of liberty against an overweening Leviathan.
In recent years, some law and religion scholars have pushed even further,
advancing a particularly robust form of religious institutionalism. As Richard
Garnett describes it, “religious institutions—self-defining, self-governing, selfdirecting institutions—are needed . . . to ‘check the encroachments of secular
power.’”205 From this point of view, religious institutions act as sources of
authority independent from the secular political state, whose reach then is
necessarily limited. Unlike traditional liberal theory, this religious
institutionalism claims a near-absolute or presumptive “sovereignty” of
religious institutions.206
This form of religious institutionalism has tended to rely on the notion of
“freedom of the church” to bolster its claims of religious sovereignty.207 But in
the wake of Hobby Lobby and its open invitation to disregard traditional
200

See id. at 858, 889.
See id. at 889.
202
See id. at 896–99.
203
Meese & Oman, supra note 76, at 299–300.
204
Michael J. DeBoer, Religious Hospitals and the Federal Community Benefit Standard-Counting
Religious Purpose as a Tax-Exemption Factor for Hospitals, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2012).
205
Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 204 (1960)); see, e.g., Kathleen A.
Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1633,
1677 (2004) (“The diversity of religious beliefs . . . presupposes a diversity of religious communities, each of
which is able to structure its own internal life according to its own unique religious views and perspectives.”).
206
E.g., Horwitz, supra note 195, at 104–09 (arguing “sphere sovereignty offers an especially full and
persuasive account of religious entities as First Amendment institutions”).
207
E.g., Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, Translation, and
Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013).
201
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distinctions among organizational forms, it is not at all clear what principles
limit expansive notions of “the church.” In their pursuit of religious exemptions,
large business corporations are described as no different than the churches and
associations that have traditionally been freed of some regulation out of concern
for religious liberty.208 Even among for-profit corporations, some say, “moral
pluralism” becomes possible through exemption from state regulation.209 These
business corporations have been “[b]aptized by association with heroic historical
organizations” and placed in the same conceptual and legal category.210
The constitutional ideal then is a fractured political community with separate
and insular institutions each able to determine and pursue their own visions of
the good in the marketplace without state interference. The “statist” CSR of
plural actors with a single decisionmaker is converted into an anti-state
enterprise of plural corporate decisionmakers.
B. Resisting Regulation
The same regulations that serve as a legitimating source for theories of CSR
play an antagonistic role in the story of corporate religious exemptions. Claims
of corporate religious exemption have prompted some in the legal academy to
pose the question: “Is the welfare state compatible with religious freedom?”211
And other conservative law and religion scholars have answered no, taking the
position of Richard Epstein, the preeminent opponent of the New Deal in the
legal academy.212 For them, “all tensions” between religion and the state arise
from state regulation of contract and employment.213
The corporations seeking exemption resist precisely these regulations.
Unlike the ideal socially responsible corporation, they do not take on additional
obligations toward state-determined ends. They do not go “above” or “beyond”
compliance with duty-imposing regulations, seeking to serve the public interest
through acts of supererogation. They instead criticize and diminish public
objectives as less than compelling. Indeed, their lawsuits can fairly be described

208
See Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 85 (2013) (“[A]llowing
normatively divergent corporations to flourish” helps “counter government-induced homogeneity and cultural
assimilation” (quoting Andrew Beerworth)).
209
Robert K. Vischer, Individual Rights vs. Institutional Identity: The Relational Dimension of Conscience
in Health Care, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 67, 68, 73–74 (2010).
210
See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1441, 1473 (1987).
211
See Berg, supra note 73, at 172.
212
Sepper, supra note 60, at 1482–83 (summarizing these claims).
213
Id.
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as seeking to substitute private moral judgments for those of democratic
lawmakers.214
A critic might say that we have mischaracterized corporate religious
exemptions as rejecting public objectives. After all, religious corporations could
be said to further the public value of religious liberty. As Angela Carmella puts
it, “[e]xemptions may be fully consistent with the state’s public order function
and the larger common good, particularly when they allow institutions in civil
society to engage in socially responsible, stabilizing and beneficial activities.”215
And because religious liberty is part of our public commitments, corporate
religious exemptions do not stand in conflict with CSR.
We agree that businesses may pursue religiously motivated goals consistent
with the tradition of CSR.216 Arguably, many of the employers objecting to the
ACA’s contraceptive mandate did just that in providing access to employersponsored health insurance, even though neither state nor federal law required
this benefit before passage of the ACA.217 To give another example, Hobby
Lobby paid well-above minimum wage to its employees due to its founder’s
religious convictions.218 In this respect, it acted consistent with the foundational
tenet of CSR—exceeding legal compliance to advance government-indicated
(but not mandated) corporate duties.
And religiously motivated businesses might promote a public good in the
form of religious liberty. One plausible example would involve an employer
subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which requires reasonable
accommodation of an employee’s religious observance or practice unless it
imposes an undue hardship on the business.219 Motivated by religion, a
corporation might offer accommodations that exceed the reasonableness

214

See Hardee, supra note 94, at 237 n.117 (describing exemptions in this way).
Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism,
and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 408 (2007).
216
See, e.g., Peter Jesserer Smith, Wegmans Among Businesses Putting Catholic Social Teaching to Good
Use, NAT’L CATH. REG. (May 2, 2017), https://www.ncregister.com/news/wegmans-among-businesses-puttingcatholic-social-teaching-to-good-use (describing Wegman’s grocery store chain’s commitment “to its five
stakeholders—the employees, the suppliers, the investors, the customers, and the community at large”).
217
Prior to the ACA, federal law encouraged employers to provide insurance by giving more favorable
tax treatment to benefits than wages.
218
Press Release, Hobby Lobby Raises Minimum Wage (Sept. 14, 2020) (on file at
https://newsroom.hobbylobby.com/articles/hobby-lobby-raises-minimum-wage/) (“In 2009, Hobby Lobby was
one of the first retailers to establish a nationwide minimum hourly wage well above the federal minimum wage
and has since raised its minimum wages ten times over the last eleven years. In 2014, Hobby Lobby raised its
full-time minimum hourly wage to $15.”).
219
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1991).
215
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threshold—for example, providing a nondenominational chapel for religious
observance. Although the Supreme Court has construed “undue hardship” to
prevent employees from claiming religious accommodations that impose
anything more than “de minimis” burdens on a business, corporations not
infrequently offer workers more generous accommodations.220 Such
corporations would satisfy the first prongs of CSR, having met the regulatory
minimum and advanced the policy objective of accommodating religious
employees that is embodied in the Civil Rights Act.
But a key difference exists between these exercises of corporate religion and
claims for corporate religious exemptions. The legal rules that shape the content
of corporate social responsibility impose duties on businesses toward the state
or people affected by their operations. In the pursuit of their own interests,
businesses impinge on the welfare of a host of social actors, including
employees, members of the local community, and the public at large. By forcing
firms to assume obligations toward others, the law makes businesses socially
accountable. CSR too is supposed to operate in this way. In principle, socially
responsible businesses consider how to structure their relationships and
operations by reference to these existing regulatory duties. When, for example,
employers offer additional health benefits or religious accommodations for
religious or ethical reasons, they follow this logic of obligation.
But the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), under which businesses
claim exemption, does not operate along similar lines. The Act does not specify
obligations that fall on corporations and thus invite the socially responsible
manager to go above and beyond them. Instead, a court faced with a RFRA claim
considers whether a business’s free exercise of religion is substantially burdened
by the application of a regulation.221 The regulation thus clashes with the
corporation’s desired activity. A court then evaluates whether the corporation’s
private interest in religious liberty overrides the governmental interest in the
regulation. Once exempted, businesses evade legal obligation despite the effects
on others—whether employees, consumers, or community members.
But the background justification for the regulation—as well as the regulation
itself—remains operative. Consider religious objections to state public
accommodations laws, which require businesses to provide equal service to
220
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). See generally Nelson Tebbe, Micah
Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW,
RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 2, at 215, 221–26 (detailing how courts have applied
the de minimis rule in more accommodating ways).
221
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2018).
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people without regard to race, sex, sexual orientation, and other protected traits.
When wedding vendors—bakeries, photography studios, hotels, and the like—
refuse service to same-sex couples, they do not deny that LGBTQ customers
have an interest in obtaining goods and services equal to others. Indeed, their
own filings tend to indicate that, with the exception of wedding products, they
accept the public interest and goal of nondiscrimination toward LGBTQ
customers.222 That accepted background justification continues to set the
direction of the social responsibility of corporations.
This analysis is baked into the standard that courts use to evaluate RFRA
claims. They must consider: Can the government still further its interest if the
legal obligation is not enforced against the objector? That is, will the background
justification for the regulation continue undamaged? Only if the answer is yes
can the accommodation, perhaps, be granted.
Proponents of corporate religious liberty often emphasize the modest and
individualized nature of exemption claims. Corporations are not asking for any
statute or regulation to be struck down in its entirety. Instead, they are merely
requesting that they be excused from a legal obligation that still applies to
everyone else without a similar religious liberty claim.223
While this way of characterizing religious exemptions may make them seem
less threatening to the social order, it also highlights their self-interested nature.
Corporations claiming religious exemptions are not acting as private attorneys
general, using accommodation regimes to vindicate social values. They are
asserting a bespoke liberty right to avoid rules laid down for everyone else.
C. A Rigid Line Between the Public and the Private
Unlike the ample public of CSR, a rigid public-private divide characterizes
claims for corporate exemption. This line operates in two ways. First, subsection
one shows that whereas CSR sees corporations as meaningfully public, claims
to religious exemption posit purely private companies. They align market actors
with intimate institutions of family and church. The primary role for law, from
this perspective, is to structure voluntary transactions within and with the firm.
Second, subsection two argues that the focus of exemptions is the self-interest
222
See e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 8–9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R. Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762, at *8–9 (“Phillips gladly serves people from all walks of life,
including individuals of all races, faiths, and sexual orientations.”).
223
E.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103,
148 (2015) (arguing accommodation “leaves the legislation in place as to the vast majority of applications and
simply requires an exception in certain cases”).
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of shareholders, not the benefit of society. Any public concern for impact and
governance becomes minimal.
1. The Privacy of the (Religious) Corporation
Proponents of corporate religious exemptions insist on the purely private
nature of the business corporation. With the closely held family business as their
touchstone, they employ a firm-family analogy, rather than the firm-state
analogy of CSR. Litigation and scholarship sharply distinguish between the
political public and the private realms of market, contract, and family.
Religious exemption advocates paint a picture of small private corporations
markedly different from the large, public corporations that inspire CSR. In
practice, claims for corporate religious exemptions—at least thus far—have
come from closely held businesses that manifest a high degree of unity between
ownership and control.224 Unlike the conglomerates of Dodd and Berle’s
concern, some claimants have been genuinely small enterprises, such as the
wedding vendors currently challenging antidiscrimination laws.225 These
businesses tend to be run by conservative businesspeople who are more-or-less
insulated from broader developments in the capital markets and the shareholder
activism that CSR often proposes.226
Characterizing objecting corporations as small and private worked to deny
the public’s interest in their operations. But as Justice Ginsberg noted in her
Hobby Lobby dissent, “‘[c]losely held’ is not synonymous with ‘small.”‘227 The
employers opposed to the contraceptive mandate, for example, were by
definition large firms—those with fifty or more full-time employees that were
subject to the Affordable Care Act.228 Yet, the popular press and scholarly
commentary tended to call them small or “mom and pop.”229 The Supreme Court
likewise labeled as “small businesses” Conestoga Wood, with over 400
employees, and Hobby Lobby, with north of 13,000 employees.230
224
See DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 1.01 (2019)
(explaining that closely held corporations tend to have a small number of owners who “take a[n] . . . active role
in the management and operation of the business”).
225
See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
226
See Wells, supra note 52, at 115.
227
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 757 n.19 (2014) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
228
26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018).
229
Ken Starr, Obamacare Shackles Religious Freedom, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/03/23/hobby-lobby-sebelius-obamacare-contraception-mandate-column/
6574699/ (describing Hobby Lobby, then with over 13,000 employees, as “mom and pop”).
230
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706 (“Is there any reason to think that the Congress that enacted such
sweeping protection put small-business owners to the choice that HHS suggests?”).

SEPPERNELSON_12.15.21

260

12/16/2021 10:35 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:217

In a move foreign to the CSR tradition, the relationships of religious
employer-employee or of vendor-consumer then were described as
appropriately governed by private law, not public interest. Many objectors to the
contraceptive mandate, for example, expressed their religious claims as a right
to contract with their employees.231 They said their employees consented—
explicitly or implicitly—to the terms of their benefits.232 From the same point of
view, antidiscrimination laws constituted infringements on the “freedom to
choose . . . whom to contract with and for what goods.”233 Echoing the
neoclassical view of corporations, religious objectors indicated that the
relationship between employer and employee, vendor and consumer, should be
set by contract without state intervention. An ideal of private ordering in matters
economic and religious dominated, and the political realm dwindled.
Even as emphasis on size and private contract appealed to privacy, an
analogy to the family further privatized the corporation. In place of the firmstate analogy of CSR theory, the quintessential “private” entity—the family—
helped the Hobby Lobby Court to categorize the plaintiffs as private. The
decision contained a lengthy description of the family members who founded,
incorporated, and ran the businesses, and their children who helped direct
them.234 According to this narrative, the corporation served as an extension of
the domestic life of the family, entitled to substantial privacy to pursue the
family’s values without government interference.235 The corporations thus
became doubly private—as entering agreements in the free market and as
reflecting intimacy in the family home. The Hobby Lobby Court effectively
bridged—to use Martha Ertman’s term—the “private/private divide.”236

231
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-00563, 2013 WL 5213640, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 2013)
(quoting mortgage company complaint arguing that compliance with the ACA “‘will have a profound and
adverse effect’ on . . . how [it] negotiate[s] contracts and compensate[s] [its] [730] employees”) (alteration in
original).
232
See Jessie Hill, Ties That Bind? The Questionable Consent Justification for Hosanna-Tabor, 109 NW.
U. L. REV. ONLINE 91, 98 (2014) (critiquing this vision of religious institutions as “stretching the idea of consent
past the breaking point”).
233
Ryan T. Anderson, ‘Homosexual Jim Crow Laws’? Get Real, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/371454/homosexual-jim-crow-laws-get-real-ryan-t-anderson. See generally Sepper,
supra note 60, at 1455–59 (arguing that in their interpretations of the First Amendment and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, courts replicate the commitment to private ordering and resistance to redistribution
that were at the heart of Lochner v. New York).
234
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 70003, 717.
235
For a discussion on the ways the market has been treated as public and individualistic and the family
as private and value-laden, see generally Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001).
236
Ertman, supra note 235, at 98.
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2. Self-Interest of Shareholders
In contrast to the “social” of CSR, the pursuit of religious exemption
advances the interests of corporate shareholders. It treats the corporation as
private property to be dispensed as its owners feel best. This inward turn creates
a form of shareholder primacy, favoring shareholders over those burdened by
corporate acts. Even according to proponents’ own lights, corporate exemptions
work in the shareholders’ personal interest, not for the general benefit of
corporate constituencies. The controlling shareholders of Hobby Lobby argued
that “[a]s with all aspects of their business, . . . it is imperative that [employee
health] benefits honor their religious convictions.”237 Likewise, the Arizona
Supreme Court described the owners of a calligraphy business as being asked to
forsake their religious convictions by “creat[ing] invitations that enable and
facilitate the attendance of guests at a same-sex wedding.”238 Complicity is at
the heart of these arguments. Complying with the law would harm their “good
conscience” by connecting them to the purportedly wrongful act (contraceptivetaking and same-sex marriage, respectively);239 exemption by contrast would
preserve their moral integrity.
In objecting to compliance with welfare or civil rights legislation, these
corporations do not purport to benefit others within society. While the objectors
may believe society would be better off if governed according to their religious
principles, they deny the objective of impeding access to contraceptives or samesex marriage. Indeed, they deny that any consequences will result from corporate
exemption—employees will still get and use contraception; same-sex couples
will still marry.240 What is at stake is the shareholders’ own spiritual interest.
This contrast between social and self-interested can be sharpened with
examples taken from the field of corporate philanthropy. When a corporation
makes a gift to United Way, it would be easy to characterize such a gift as
beneficial to the wider society. Indeed, according to the organization’s mission
statement, “United Way improves lives by mobilizing the caring power of
communities around the world to advance the common good.”241
237
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Opening Brief in Support, Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius,
870 F. Supp. 2d (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV-12-1000-HE), 2012 WL 5851136.
238
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 919–22 (Ariz. 2019).
239
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Opening Brief in Support, supra note 237
240
Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17–20, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pa. 2-13) (No. 5:12-cv-06744-MSG) (arguing the government could not
show any compelling interest in requiring contraceptive coverage because it could not prove that employees
were not already accessing and using contraceptives, notwithstanding lack of employee health coverage).
241
Our Mission, UNITED WAY, https://www.unitedway.org/our-impact/mission (last visited Nov. 11,
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But corporate philanthropy aimed at branding,242 self-dealing,243 or personal
ideology244 stands differently. Gifts to managers’ favorite social clubs or vanity
projects are not in the public’s interest. And corporate political spending
designed for partisan ends promotes neither social wealth nor democratic
equality.245 In each instance, social concern recedes, and self-interest becomes
primary.
The Supreme Court’s decisions embraced this primacy of shareholders’
personal interests over those of other stakeholders. Hobby Lobby, for example,
maintained that corporate exemption “protects the religious liberty of the
humans who own and control those companies.”246 Likewise, in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a First Amendment case in
which a bakery sought exemption from antidiscrimination law, the Supreme
Court emphasized the interests of its owner, Jack Phillips, in running the
business consistent with his personal views.247
With the unification of ownership and control, the owners’ interests in
religious liberty became the corporation’s, and the corporation’s decisions about
employee benefits became the owners’. Indeed, the most prominent
manifestations of corporate religious exemption presumed a unity between
shareholder and corporation. As cases percolated up to the Supreme Court, lower
courts that granted religious exemptions typically held that the corporation and
its owners were coextensive.248 For example, one court said that “when the
beliefs of a closely-held corporation and its owners are inseparable, the
corporation should be deemed the alter-ego of its owners for religious
2021).
242
See, e.g., P. Rajan Varadarajan & Anil Menon, Cause-Related Marketing: A Coalignment of Marketing
Strategy and Corporate Philanthropy, 52 J. MKTG. 58, 58–59 (1988).
243
See Khan v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 51, 54 (Del. 1991) (discussing Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s
$85 million pledge to fund the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural Center, a pet project of the
company’s chairman). For discussion of this case and others involving self-interested philanthropy, see Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 579, 61920 (1997).
244
See Stevelman Kahn, supra note 243, at 61113 (discussing Morrison Knudsen Corporation’s donation
to The Nurturing Network, an anti-abortion organization founded by the CEO’s wife).
245
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the
Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1007,
1019–20, 1022, 1024–26 (2020); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and
After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 658 (2012).
246
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707 (2014) (emphasis added).
247
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724, 1726, 1728 (2018).
248
Korte v. Sebelius, 528 F. App’x 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that corporate form is not dispositive
because the individual plaintiffs would “violate their religious beliefs” if the corporation had to comply with the
mandate).
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purposes.”249 By contrast, when a corporation adopts a CSR initiative,
shareholders “can derive benefit from it, but neither they nor other constituencies
are the responsible ‘corporate’ actor, in the eyes of the law or in society at
large.”250
The interests of constituents other than the owners mattered little to the
exercise of corporate religion. While Justice Alito gestured in Hobby Lobby
toward the idea that corporate religious liberty could also safeguard officers and
employees “who are associated with a corporation in one way or another,”251 the
religion of constituents other than the shareholders remained unexamined.
Indeed, the opinion referred to employees as “third parties” unrepresented by
their employers’ religious claims.252 Justice Kennedy similarly noted that the
accommodation of a business’s exercise of religion reflected the interests of the
owners not the efforts of “other persons, such as employees, in protecting their
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.”253 Indeed, the entire debate
over “third party harms” takes for granted that many religious accommodations
will disadvantage third parties.254 The benefits of corporate religious exemptions
flow to owners instead of employees, customers, and society—presenting a
persistent disanalogy with CSR.
This distinction further indicates that many religiously motivated corporate
acts—even those that comply with positive law—do not amount to social
responsibility. The law may be neutral as to holiday greetings, Sunday closures,
and religious products, but a company with such policies acts in its own interests
and pursues goals defined by individual conscience. Such indifference to the
values and expectations of society or to the myriad constituencies affected falls
outside the bounds of corporate social responsibility.255

249
Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F.
Supp. 2d 794, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (adopting alter ego theory).
250
Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 30.
251
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706.
252
Id. at 729–30 n.37.
253
Id. at 739 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
254
On one side, critics argue that imposing such costs is constitutionally impermissible. See Nelson Tebbe,
Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in THE
CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 328, 329–30
(Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018); Tebbe et al., supra note 220, at 215; Frederick Mark Gedicks
& Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 346–48 (2014). On the other side, defenders claim
that those costs are justified by our commitment to religious liberty. See Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment
“Harms,” 95 IND. L.J. 331, 338 (2020); Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause,
and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 876–77 (2019).
255
For a proponent of corporate religious exemption making this point, see Meese, supra note 96.
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***
The irreconcilable differences between the political economies of corporate
social responsibility and corporate religious exemption do not ultimately resolve
whether or when religious exemptions for business corporations are justified.
Nevertheless, our account leads to the modest conclusion that scholars and
litigants should abandon their reliance on this strained analogy. They must
pursue alternative and better-grounded arguments for religious exemption.
V. RETIREMENT OR REVIVAL OF PRINCIPLED CSR?
The theory of corporate social responsibility is at an inflection point. Two
possibilities emerge for its theorists—retirement or revival. Perhaps CSR has
run its course. As we have shown, Hobby Lobby—once claimed as a win—
reflects commitments antithetical to the political economy of corporate social
responsibility. It converts the normative pull of heightened corporate
responsibility into increased corporate authority. Alternatively, burgeoning
literatures on law and political economy and sociopolitical movements to hold
corporations accountable might embrace—and revive—the insights of CSR’s
intellectual history. We briefly sketch each of these paths.
A. Time for Retirement?
For decades, critics from the left have argued that, in practice, corporate
social responsibility bears little resemblance to the principled version we have
described. They say that it provides a smokescreen for profit-seeking (and thus
is not CSR at all).256 And by granting commercial entities the authority to
perform more and more tasks once left to the state, it serves neoliberalism.257
From this point of view, the enthusiasm of big corporations for CSR has
atrophied the political domain258—consistent not with the democratic political
256
E.g., Michael L. Barnett, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Critique and an
Indirect Path Forward, 58 BUS. & SOC’Y 167, 167 (2019) (noting that firms’ “increasingly strategic view of
CSR” increases firm financial performance but the gaps between the interests of business and society grow);
Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227,
1239 (2002) (“There is real concern that corporate social responsibility will become just another commodity that
businesses sell in the service of short-term shareholder wealth maximization, rather than the basis for any
substantive change in the way business is done”).
257
Peter Utting, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Movement of Business, 15 DEV. PRAC. 375, 380
(2005).
258
Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World-Culture or World-Capitalism?, 45
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 314 (2011); Utting, supra note 257, at 384 (noting that one “major criticism of CSR
relates to so-called ‘regulatory’ or ‘institutional capture,’ . . . the increasing penetration and influence of large
corporations in the public-policy process”).
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economy we describe but with the weak state that corporate religious
exemptions propose. Viewed in this way, CSR’s practice more or less aligns
with the political economy of corporate religious exemptions.
CSR advocates in the academy, however, have consistently resisted these
corporate practices. They have maintained a principled stance, notwithstanding
cooptation of CSR by less scrupulous managers. Now, some of these scholars
claim corporate religious exemption as their own. But our account makes clear
that the pro-democratic “statist” theory of CSR cannot be reconciled with the
radically different vision of law, politics, and the economy of religious
exemptions. Stretched to include corporate exemptions from employee and
consumer protections, the idea of corporate social responsibility becomes
corrupted beyond recognition.
Three aspects of this corruption bear noting. First, corporate social
responsibility comes to mean all things, or nothing at all. Hobby Lobby withheld
benefits from employees, resisted federal law, and diminished the government’s
interest in women’s health. From there, it is a short step to Harris Funeral Homes
terminating an employee for dressing in accordance with her gender identity or
Telescope Media denying videography services to same sex couples. What about
a corporation that is dedicated to achieving white supremacy or supporting
violent insurrection? If all corporate acts that are not profit-maximizing count as
social responsibility—no matter their goals, ideology, or consistency with the
flourishing of society—then the idea is, and ought to be, a dead letter.
Second, assimilation of corporate religious exemptions converts CSR from
a prosocial to an antisocial program. As we have explained, the intellectual
history of corporate social responsibility sees corporations as institutions
embedded in and contributing to society. To include corporate exemptions
within the definition of socially responsible behavior means permitting
corporations to pursue their own private objectives without serious inhibitions
stemming from concern for others. In the extreme case, following the lead of
early neoliberal thinkers like Friedrich Hayek, the “social” in CSR disappears
altogether.259
Third, such corruption of CSR further weakens government and, in turn, the
sincere practice of CSR. As we have demonstrated, throughout its history, CSR

259
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 62–
100 (1976) (claiming social justice is a “mirage”); see also Interview by Douglas Keay, Woman’s Own, with
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, at No. 10 Downing Street (Sept. 23, 1987), https://www.margaretthatcher.
org/document/106689 (“There is no such thing as society.”).
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has been interwoven with the political state. As it developed, the principled
practice of CSR depended on a healthy and functioning state to set the normative
course for businesses. Democratic politics were not assumed to be perfect, but
they were thought to undergird legitimate corporate social action. If, instead, the
state is no longer willing—or no longer able—to set down normative markers
for corporations to follow, then the threat of regulation—and its hydraulic
pressure on corporate activity—no longer seems plausible. And CSR as we have
known it can barely get off the ground.
CSR instead may morph from a constructive force in American politics into
a weapon of neoliberal anti-politics. Recall that corporate religious exemptions
resist regulation and treat the state as a threat. So, too, with the momentum of
antipolitical forces, many Americans have come to see government as “the
problem, not the solution.”260 Decades of anti-state rhetoric denigrating
government as “interest-group capture and entrenchment”261 have had real
political consequences. Through demonization and defunding, the state has
become increasingly distrusted and dysfunctional. There may be no better
illustration of this point than the government’s abject failure to control the
deadly spread of COVID-19. When you try to drown the government in a
bathtub, as commentators have observed, sometimes you succeed.262
B. Opportunity for Revival?
What are the prospects for reviving the idea of corporate social
responsibility? Burgeoning proposals for corporate accountability might find
insight from the earlier—and more authentic—versions of CSR that we have
discussed. In the last few years, the corporate law community has rekindled
longstanding debates over corporate purposes.263 Business schools are engaged
in cognate efforts to put “purpose before profit.”264 And major institutional
260
WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE
WEST 58 (2019) (quoting a common neoliberal refrain from the Reagan-Thatcher years).
261
Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Lawand-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1807 (2020).
262
For a variation on this point, see Dana Milbank, Opinion, When You Drown the Government in the
Bathtub, People Die, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/10/
when-you-drown-government-bathtub-people-die/ (discussing Grover Norquist’s idea to shrink government to
the size where “we can . . . drown it in the bathtub”).
263
See, e.g., Martin Lipton, William Savitt & Karessa L. Cain, On the Purpose of the Corporation, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/27/on-thepurpose-of-the-corporation/; Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug, 19, 2019),
https://purpose.businessroundtable.org.
264
See Corporations and Society Initiative, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., https://www.gsb.stanford.
edu/faculty-research/centers-initiatives/casi (last visited Nov. 11, 2021); Future of the Corporation, THE BRITISH
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investors have announced their intention to ratchet up demands for corporate
social responsibility.265 Prominent policymakers, including Senators Bernie
Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Tammy Baldwin, have introduced legislation
aimed to enhance corporate accountability.266 And in the legal academy,
progressive scholars have launched formidable challenges to the neoliberal
consensus, insisting that “the political community must be able to assert its
collective will over the economic order.”267
One place to start would be to recover the notion that law plays a constitutive
role in the modern economy. Consistent with legal realism, theorists of CSR
understood that there is nothing natural or inevitable about markets—they are
constructed by an interlocking web of background legal regimes, including
property law, contract law, tax law, and organizational law.268 Their work
provides further foundation for shattering artificial notions of a clean line
between public and private. And as Sanjukta Paul reminds us, because the law
constitutes markets, we are free to constitute them differently.269
How might reconstructing a democratic vision of corporate social
responsibility take place? One way to revive CSR’s commitment to democracy
would focus on matters internal to the corporation. Progressive scholars have
long criticized corporate governance for not sufficiently representing the
interests of those who contribute to firms’ team production.270 Corporate law is
intensely focused on the relationship between boards of directors and
shareholders. And although some argue that directors may take interests other
than shareholder wealth into account, the right to vote at annual elections and on
fundamental transactions is vested exclusively in shareholders.271 This exclusive
shareholder franchise, it is said, leaves the interests of other corporate
constituencies unrepresented.272
ACAD., https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/programmes/future-of-the-corporation/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
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To remedy this representational deficit, CSR proponents might advocate for
expanded corporate voting rights. In contemporary debates, most advocates of
reform have focused on empowering employees. Senator Warren’s proposed
Accountable Capitalism Act, for example, calls for employee election of at least
forty percent of the board at large companies.273 Many supporters point to the
German codetermination model as a viable system of employee representation
in an advanced industrial economy.274
More broadly, calls to democratize the internal governance of corporations
resonate with an emerging intellectual appetite to apply concepts drawn from
political science to nominally private businesses.275 The hope is that an internally
democratized firm will better reflect the interests of all constituencies, while
avoiding some of the excessive social costs that come with shareholder
primacy.276 Political scientist David Ciepley, for example, argues that
stockholders “are just one contributor to the success of the firm,” and once we
discard myths about their primacy, we can see that the real questions are about
fair distribution of economic surplus.277
Rather than focus on representation, a reinvigorated democratic CSR might
seek to limit the power that corporations wield over their various constituencies.
Contemporary advocates of this approach have emphasized the outsized—and
often unchecked—authority that corporations hold over their workers.278 This
emphasis on authority has led to a revival of the firm-state analogy and the idea
that corporations exercise a form of “private government.”279 In other work, we
have drawn on the firm-state analogy to explore limits on corporate authority in
religious businesses.280 At a minimum, reviving a principled version of CSR
273
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would destabilize the notion of a private economy of voluntary contracts free
from coercion. It would replace that myth—that “insecurity of illusion”281—
with the reality of pervasive power relations.
Another avenue for reviving CSR’s commitment to democracy would be to
focus on the external relationship between corporations and the state. On this
approach, concerns of internal corporate governance—who gets to vote, what
they vote on, and what kind of information they need to make informed
decisions—recede, and the concerns of political democracy rise to the top.
This revived form of CSR could link up with contemporary movements to
see economic relations in “constitutional” terms.282 In a recent book, for
example, Tim Wu argues that concentration of private power in our economic
system threatens the foundations of democracy, reaching “constitutional
dimensions.”283 Though Wu identifies Louis Brandeis as his inspiration,284
CSR’s intellectual history teems with support.285
Once again, CSR’s revival might learn best from its own history. In the
1950s and ‘60s, for example, the firm-state analogy led mainstream legal
scholars to debate whether corporations should—or would—have constitutional
responsibilities. In 1952, Berle published an article arguing that corporations
should be subject to many of the same constitutional limitations that applied to
political states to avoid violations of individual liberty.286 And Abram Chayes
relatedly proposed due process type limitations on corporations to guarantee that
“significant power will be exercised not arbitrarily, but in a manner that can be
rationally related to the legitimate purposes of the society.”287
Advocates of CSR might also be able to leverage (re-)emerging scholarly
interest in law and political economy.288 As one recent statement describes it,
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this intellectual program urges scholars to focus on “the relation of politics to
the economy, understanding that the economy is always already political in both
its origins and its consequences.”289 This movement identifies three central
issues of political economy. First, blinkered focus on shareholder wealth has
made our economy insufficiently sensitive to the plight of workers.290 Second,
concerns for economic efficiency have too often fostered autocratic corporate
management.291 And third, industrial concentration paired with a hollowed-out
welfare state has inverted the goals of democracy.292 A lasting insight of CSR
theorists is that these themes are tied together.
Here, the ways in which CSR proponents foregrounded questions of power
in economic relations could be especially instructive. In Power Without
Property, Berle outlined a “democratic economy” in terms of a “balance
between the forces which may be called ‘democratic’ and those whose authority
is derived from historical property rights rather than popular mandate.”293 This
democratic political economy required responsiveness to the will of the people
through a system of industrial government.294 Striking notes of democratic
aspiration, the economy would function as “a sort of continuing election in
which there are no nonvoters.”295
Despite warnings from their ancestors, those concerned with preserving the
values of a free society too often have focused on abuse of public power to the
exclusion of growing threats from the private sphere. The urgent question now,
as Katharina Pistor argues, is whether we continue to put the law in service of
private capital or whether we put it in service of something else.296 CSR indicates
that something else must be democracy.
***
We make no predictions about how CSR will develop in the coming years
and decades. The economic, social, and political inflection point at which we
find ourselves is particularly unstable. Nevertheless, CSR proponents might
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have reason for optimism, as CSR was forged in the fire of economic turmoil
and corporate failure. In a time when interest in corporate accountability and
democratic political economy is on the rise, theories of corporate social
responsibility might still hold important lessons.
CONCLUSION
The intellectual history of corporate social responsibility reflects a profound
concern for corporate excess and governance failure. In theory, if not always in
practice, CSR offers a mechanism to address power imbalances between the
corporation and its vulnerable stakeholders. The responsibility is not of the
corporation to its owners, but of the corporation to a wider society of others. In
its ideal form, the concept of socially responsible corporations subscribes to a
distinctly democratic political economy where corporations support the state.
Corporate religious exemptions deny these foundational agreements.
Corporate religious objectors fail to meet, let alone exceed, the regulatory
minimum promulgated by the state. Claiming a right to avoid regulation,
proponents posit the state as infringing on freedom and corporations as
intermediaries ensuring a plural and free society. They seek autonomy to
advance their own interests, not partner with the state in the interests of others.
The disconnect between CSR and religious exemption does not ultimately
resolve whether or when corporate religious objectors should be able to avoid
regulation. But it does make clear that CSR provides no support for granting
exemptions to religiously motivated businesses. Conversely, it indicates that
corporate social responsibility may have been irreparably corrupted by a rush to
embrace corporate religion.
From this story broader questions emerge about the historical contingency
of this particular resurgence of debate over CSR. Why has the intellectual battle
over the nature of the corporation’s duties to society re-emerged now? What
factors are driving the decision to label religious exemptions as CSR? If CSR is
not an appropriate model for these exemptions, what historical antecedents best
explain the phenomenon? What does the vision of political economy represented
by corporate religious exemptions share with past visions of a democracy? What
might CSR offer to emerging scholarly and advocacy efforts to tame giant
corporations? Scholars of history, corporate law, constitutional doctrine, and
beyond must take up these questions.

